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Bolivia’s indigenous groups achieved an unprecedented level of political power in 
the latter half of the twentieth century.   Traditional explanations for this phenomenon 
(elite alliances, deprivation, matter-of-time) have proven insufficient. This thesis argues 
that the ascendancy of Bolivia’s groups can be best understood though the application of 
organization and social movement theories, and it uses the political economy framework 
as a backdrop.  Data are drawn from scholarly analyses, official documents and historical 
texts.  This thesis concludes that Bolivia’s indigenous movement is not a single 
movement, but a coalition of many social movements.  It demonstrates that ethnicity 
frameworks have in some cases hindered the progress of movements because of different 
understandings of ethnicity.  Variegated interests, visions of the future, and geography, 
have exacerbated these differences.  This thesis concludes with recommendations for 
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The histories of indigenous populations in Latin America have long been wrought 
with themes of oppression, exploitation and exclusion.  These themes have endured for 
these populations, whether at the hand of the Aztec or Incan empires, the Spanish or the 
North Americans.  Despite this, the ethnic populations in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia have 
played a role in shaping the future of each state, mostly as a buttress for elite opposition 
groups seeking power.  What is significant is that over the past twenty-five years, 
indigenous movements along the Andean Ridge have begun to shape the state in ways 
more attuned to their own interests.  What is puzzling is how recently these events in 
Bolivia have occurred given that roughly two-thirds of its population is composed of 
ethnic peoples and has been so for many years. 
This thesis attempts to explain this recent phenomenon by looking specifically at 
the ascendancy of indigenous groups in Bolivia.  Foremost, it attempts to determine how 
the structure of Bolivia’s indigenous groups has affected their power, i.e., their ability to 
oppose or leverage the state.  Secondary questions assess the effects of inherent structure, 
domestic and foreign actors, technology and geography on the strength of indigenous 
movements. 
This chapter presents the significance of studying structure, and is followed by the 
hypothesis that explains indigenous power.  The methodology section provides the 
analytical framework and identifies the actors involved in the study.  Following the 
section on data sources, a roadmap is provided that outlines the study.  Chapter one 
concludes with a brief description of indigenous societies, their structures, and a physical 
description of “Bolivia” prior to the arrival of the Spanish in 1532.  This provides the 
foundation upon which this thesis is built.  
B. RELEVANCE 
Why study the power mechanisms of indigenous groups?  In places such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and the like, the United States has come to relearn that 





indigenous population.1  Simply put, it is helpful to study indigenous power mechanisms 
because these groups are gaining political significance in environments where US foreign 
policy emphasis is normally directed towards traditional state/elite actors, and social and 
developmental programs for the population are of only secondary importance.  As 
indigenous groups begin to gain access to the levers of power, it is imperative that US 
policy take into account their interests, and that the US craft its policy in such a way that 
takes advantage of indigenous interests in order to maximize its potential for success. 
US foreign policy towards the region has been a combination of successes and 
failures.  Recent US interest in Bolivia has focused on curtailing the illicit coca trade.  To 
that end, the US made its greatest strides during the 1990s as Bolivia’s estimated coca 
cultivation was reduced from an estimated 240 metric tons (MT) annually to just less than 
60 MT at its lowest point in 2001.2  Eradication and interdiction efforts were reinforced 
with aid and development programs that focused on alternative crop cultivation, 
education, and judicial and law enforcement reform.  However, as US attention began to 
focus on Colombia, and ultimately the Global War on Terror following the turn of the 
century, Bolivia immediately began a social and economic backslide.  While the US was 
not directly responsible for the ouster of President “Goni” Sanchez de Lozada in 2003, 
it’s lacking and misplaced attention overlooked one of the new centers of gravity in 
Bolivian politics: indigenous movements.  Goni’s requests to the US for economic 
assistance during a time of fiscal frugality were denied, making it even harder for him to 
consolidate economic gains thus far and to alleviate opposition from below.    
Among the Andean nations, why use Bolivia as a case study?  First and foremost, 
it is the one location where indigenous movements have gained significant traction, and 
where their dependency on elites has diminished substantially.  Colombia was ruled out 
because the insurgency-trafficker-weak state mix presents too many variables that 
obscure the impact of indigenous populations, and it more closely resembles two 
entrenched, opposing hierarchical organizations—one legal (the state) and one illegal (the 
                                                 
1 Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, OP-127-IPC/CMEPP (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2004), 10. 
 2US Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration), Drug Intelligence Brief, Changing 
Dynamics of Cocaine Production in the Andean Region (June 2002).  Http://www.usdoj.gov/d ea/pubs/intel 





Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) than it does networked 
organizations.3  Despite the election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001, Peru was not selected 
because his election was more a popular reaction to Fujimori’s corruption than it was a 
true triumph of ethnic politics, what Mainwaring calls “antiparty” politics.4  In Ecuador, 
indigenous groups have made significant strides, which are highlighted by their uprisings 
in 2001 and the significant role their group played in the election of Colonel Lucio 
Gutierrez Borbua in 2002.  However, their power is still closely linked to disaffected 
elites, and they have yet to stand alone to the extent demonstrated by ethnic groups in 
Bolivia.      
Other researchers have focused on the gradual inclusion of ethnic peoples in the 
democratic processes of the state.  Scholars such as Van Cott, Yashar and Larson have 
focused their studies on the degrees of ethnic peoples’ inclusion within the state and 
individual rights by examining democratic legislation and governance structure.  This 
thesis departs from their work by redirecting attention towards the relationships of 
indigenous groups among themselves, to specific actors within the state, foreign states, 
and non-state actors such as worldwide ethnic peoples coalitions, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and insurgencies 
(e.g., Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).  The linkages developed by these 
relationships provide indigenous groups with mechanisms for interactions with the state 
both within and outside of legal confines. 
The increasing capacity of Bolivia’s indigenous movements, combined with the 
weakness of the state, also makes these movements and linkages worthy of investigation.  
While ethnic revolution is highly unlikely, it is also quite unnecessary.  Indigenous 
movements have access to resources like never before.  These resources enable 
indigenous populations to undertake action that may serve their own interests, but may 
also contribute to national and regional instability.  Essentially, these movements exist in 
an environment that supports their own independent action; however, this environment 
                                                 
 3 In the context of this thesis, Colombia is useful as an example of what can occur when competing 
power structures are allowed to emerge and remain unchecked due to state or other weaknesses. 
 4 Scott Mainwaring, “Party Systems in the Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy, vol 9, no. 3 (July 
1998): 71.  Available from Project MUSE.  Http://muse.jhu.edu/jour nals/journal_of_democracy/v009/9 





also supports other nefarious factions that may operate beyond the vigilance of the state.  
And, while indigenous groups may be gaining ascendancy, neither they nor the state 
possess the capacity to control Bolivia’s borders or its most rural regions.  This weakness, 
combined with the decreasing transparency of indigenous groups, creates an environment 
that is conducive to exploitation by criminal and insurgent elements for their own 
purposes. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
Much of the literature on indigenous conflict in Latin America focuses on the 
relationship between state and indigenous movement.  However, treating the various 
peoples’ groups in Latin America (and the state, for that matter) as a single, unitary actor 
does not provide sufficient fidelity to explain periods of waxing and waning indigenous 
power.  Indigenous peoples comprise nearly two-thirds of Bolivia’s population.  
Although three major groups exist, Aymara: 1.6 million, Quechua: 2.5 million, and 
Guarani and others: approximately 92,000, they may be further subdivided into thirty-two 
groups based on language, culture and ethnicity (other groups include the 
Araucanians/Mapuchi, Uru, Ayoreo, Wichi, Mojena, Sirionos, Moxeños, Yuracares, 
Sireneires, More, Sansimonianos, Pausernas, Baures, Paunacas, Canichanas, Joras, 
Chacobos, Chamas, Tacanas, Chimanes, Movimas, Sinabos, Cayubabas and Itonomas).5  
Their diversity of interests and varying relationships among themselves and with other 
actors warrants deeper investigation; to assume that indigenous group identification, poor 
living conditions, and repressive state regimes are sufficient conditions for rebellion 
cannot explain why indigenous groups did not come to power even earlier.   
This thesis argues that the explanation for the rise in indigenous power and 
capacity can more accurately be attributed to the internal and external structures of 
Bolivia’s ethnic groups.  In fact, their power can be explained through the organizational 
structures created by these relationships and interactions, and the “power” capacity that 
has been transferred through these linkages.  Essentially, the structure of Bolivia’s ethnic 
                                                 
 5 Compiled from (1) Bret Gustafson, “Paradoxes of Liberal Indigenism: Indigenous Movements, State 
Processes, and Intercultural Reform in Bolivia,” D. Maybury Lewis, ed., The Politics of Ethnicity: Peoples 
in Latin American States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 271 and (2) Javier Beltran, 
“Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas: Principles, Guidelines and Case Studies 





groups have transformed from tribal and hierarchical structures into networked structures 
that possess an inherent level of capacity to oppose the state and even thrive in its 
absence. 
Some might argue the answer to the rise in indigenous power can be attributed to 
increasing levels of democratization.  However, this argument does not account for the 
enduring power structures.  While the greatest rise in power for Bolivia’s indigenous 
population has occurred in the past twenty-five years, to assume that this is solely a 
recent phenomenon is also insufficient to explain their ascendancy.  In fact, these groups 
have always wielded some form of power, the structures of which can be traced back to 
the fourteenth century Aymara kingdoms.  Furthermore, not all of the indigenous groups, 
which occupied the area that would become Bolivia, experienced the same levels of 
exclusion or autonomy.  What is significant about the last twenty-five years is that it is 
during this time period that indigenous groups became movements, resource availability 
improved, and the movements took advantage of political opportunities that presented 
themselves. 
Others might argue that indigenous power is solely a function of their majority.  
However, if that were true, it does not explain why indigenous groups did not come to 
power sooner.  Finally, one might argue that indigenous power can be explained simply 
by looking at their groups’ ties with elites.  However, as will be demonstrated, while 
these alliances have occurred in Bolivia’s history, indigenous groups have also occupied 
inherent positions of strength which allowed them to impose their demands on elites.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
To understand the development of indigenous power in Bolivia, this thesis uses a 
combination of political economy and social movement theory to examine the 
relationships of major actors and the evolution of indigenous group organization.  
Political economy analysis is used to explain the various outcomes of the relationships of 
the actors to one another.  To understand these outcomes, first the actors and their 
interests are defined.  Second, the coalitions formed by actors with common interests and 
how these interests may have been altered as a result of forming coalitions is examined.  





outcomes are described.  These structures may be both formal and informal.  Formal 
mechanisms are essentially the legal means through which outcomes are produced (i.e., 
laws, treaties, accepted procedures, etc,).  Informal mechanisms are those more directly 
related to soft power, or “influence short of violence.”6  Finally, the outcomes produced 
by these coalitions and decision-making structures are examined.  A key outcome that is 
helpful to this analysis is the examination of coalitions following decisions.  Do these 
relationships endure?  Or do actors defect to other preferences once their primary 
objectives are achieved?  In his work on peasant mobilization, Singlemann identifies the 
difficulties of consolidating and sustaining power that all rising agents face: 
…If we critically examine the kinds of interests served by the movements  
and the nature as well as limitations of their group solidarity, it becomes 
apparent that campesinos have not yet become a ‘class for itself.’  They  
are divided along several lines; many engage in temporary joint actions 
for limited purposes at a given time, but few have persisted in a sustained 
new efforts to renew the large social order….  Their ‘interest articulation’ 
thus does not necessarily emancipate them as a class.7   
 
E. NETWAR 
This thesis then draws on the work of Arquilla and Ronfeldt to help examine, 
describe and classify the relationships and outcomes using three organizational concepts 
(tribal/clan, hierarchical, and networked).  Essentially, hierarchical forms organization, 
combined with market forms, favor the state, but limit “social equity.”  The network form 
of organization is collaborative and adds strength to non-state organizations such as 
social movements.8 
Networked organizations possess the greatest relative amount of inherent 
capacity.  Networks offer opportunity and access to resources (and targets) that are less 
transparent and therefore less susceptible to surveillance and countering efforts.  Network 
structure also allows weaker organizations to exist and endure in environments where 
                                                 
6 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 166.  
 7 Peter Singlemann, “The Closing Triangle: Critical Notes on a Model for Peasant Mobilization in 
Latin America,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 17. no. 4: Peasant Political Mobilization, 
(October 1975): 404.  Available from JSTOR. Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-4175%28197510%291 
7%3A4%3C389%3ATCTCNO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 





they would otherwise fail if they attempted to remain organized along more transparent 
or hierarchical lines. 
Ronfeldt, Arquilla and the Fullers describe the strength of networked 
organizations in The Zapatistas and Social Netwar in Mexico.  Essentially, the Ejercito 
Liberacion Zapatista Nacional increased their own resistance capacity and mitigated the 
state’s coercion capacity by networking with international NGOs.  This example helps 
illuminate the characteristics of threats emerging around the globe, and the rise of netwar:  
an emerging form of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, involving  
measures short of traditional war. In which protagonists use network forms of 
organization and related doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to the 
information age.  These protagonists are likely to consist of small groups who 
communicate, coordinate, and conduct their small campaigns in an internetted 
manner, without a precise central command.9 
 
Gerlach and Hine define the properties of these networked protagonists with 
respect to social movements.  This is pertinent to the thesis as indigenous power 
structures transform themselves from economic oriented organizations (unions) into true 
indigenous rights (social) movements (and combinations thereof).  These groups exhibit 
the following characteristics known as “SpiNs”: 
Segmentary: Composed of many diverse groups, which grow and die,  
divide and fuse, proliferate and contract. 
 
Polycentric: Having multiple, often temporary, and sometimes competing  
leaders or centers of influence. 
  
Networked: Forming a loose, reticulate, integrated network with multiple  
linkages through travelers, overlapping membership, joint activities,  
common reading matter, and shared ideals and opponents.  Integrating  
factors are…what they (movements) share in common.10 
For this thesis, the culmination of netwar and SPiNs is a potentially new type of 
insurgency in Latin America that could be considered a third wave to Wickam-Crowley’s 
first and second waves.11  What makes the third wave unique is that control of the state is 
                                                 
9 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 5. 
 10 Luther P. Gerlach and Virgina L. Hine, The Structure of Social Movements: Environmental Activism 
and its Opponents, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2001), 289-90, 299. 
 11 Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of 





not the overall goal of the insurgents.  Rather, because they can subsist outside of the 
state, efforts may be directed towards keeping the state weak.  These groups may, in fact, 
direct their energies towards developing short and long-term cross-state support and 
governance structures that undermine legitimate state-directed development efforts.  
Also, insurgent (or opposition) leadership in the third wave is not necessarily a role for 
disaffected elites, as was the case during the first and second waves.  Leadership may 
remain inherently indigenous.  
F. ACTORS 
The actors examined within this thesis include indigenous peoples (peasants, 
miners and urban laborers), criollos, mine owners, the military, elite liberals and 
conservatives, foreign states, the international community (IC), NGOs, TCOs and 
insurgents.  Significant disparities that exist among otherwise common groups will be 
highlighted to the extent that their divisions create different outcomes.  For example, 
tribes of similar ethnicity in proximity to one another may actually take different 
approaches to development and alliance-building based on the factor endowments 
provided by the land they occupy. 
G. DATA SOURCES 
A variety of sources are drawn from for this thesis.  Specific historical evidence is 
selected from the research of Klein and Healy, as well as from historical documents and 
print media.  Historical data are reinforced by the scholarly analyses of state development 
by Van Cott, Yashar and Larson.  Works on indigenous movements published by Gill and 
Gustafson provide the foundation for highlighting diverse interests and approaches to 
government.  Information is also drawn from internet and print-based documents 
provided by governments, indigenous organizations, political parties and NGOs.  Finally, 
where possible, interviews with actors and researchers have been used to add fidelity to 
the argument.      
H. ROADMAP 
This thesis is chronologically organized into four subsequent chapters.  Each 





political economy methodology, and covers the significant events that hallmark each 
period. 
Chapter II begins with a brief synopsis of Bolivia’s indigenous population 
following the arrival of the Spanish and leading up to the first major indigenous uprising: 
the Tupac Amaru rebellion of 1770.  Part one covers the period from 1770 to Bolivia’s 
independence in 1825.  Part two of this chapter covers the developments of the post-
Independence period through the termination of the War of the Pacific in 1880.  It is 
during these periods that indigenous power was mostly a function of weak, power-
seeking opposition elites, as well as the ability of ethnic groups to adapt. 
Chapter III covers the period up to and including the seizure of power by the 
MNR in 1952-53.  It addresses the role of economic development, the rise of socialism 
and major events such as the Chaco War and the rise of the MNR—indigenous 
relationship.  It is during this period when the cracks in the dam start to appear with the 
respect to rising indigenous power.  Indigenous groups slowly begin to organize along 
indigenous (vice economic) lines and strengthen their internal network.  Although not 
recognized at the time (and not that it could have been), it is during this period that the 
subtle tipping point occurs in favor of indigenous ascendancy. 
Chapter IV covers the period from 1954 to 2004, and it argues that, during this 
time, indigenous movements developed into networked organizations.  Increased regional 
and international linkages achieved greater levels during this period for all of the actors 
examined.  It is also during this period when peasant and workers unions gain strength, 
from which emerge purely indigenous rights and interest-oriented movements.   
Chapter V summarizes the arguments of the previous chapters and presents the 
major findings of the thesis.  First, cleavages among Bolivia’s indigenous peoples existed 
prior to, during and beyond the times of Spanish conquest; these cleavages were the 
result of both internal and external actors and interests.  Second, these cleavages have 
traditionally been a source of weakness for indigenous populations.  However, the effects 
of this are becoming mitigated by evolution towards network structures.  Third, the rise 





Fourth, alliances with domestic elites and foreign actors, reinforced by increasing 
access to support systems (health, education, governance, etc.) and communication 
technologies, have fostered the slow saturation of traditionally elite-dominated realms by 
the indigenous society.  In essence, it has been a slow revolution-from-below that is 
usurping traditional power sources of the state without an overthrow or replacement of 
government. 
Fifth, the regional and international internetted character of Bolivia’s indigenous 
population, combined with the weakness of the state, provides these movements with 
options outside of the state’s legal framework if conditions deteriorate.  Sixth, these 
organizations are less susceptible than their predecessors to elite influence.  Foreign and 
non-state actors, combined with improved communication technologies have provided 
indigenous groups with sources of power that allow them to indirectly challenge the state.  
Finally, indigenous groups have become significant actors that should be reflected in US 
foreign policy towards the region.  
I. BOLIVIA BEFORE THE 16TH CENTURY 
1. Geography 
Modern day Bolivia is roughly the size of Montana and consists of three 
geographical regions.  First is the Altiplano, tucked between the Cordillera Occidental 
and Cordillera Real ranges, that comprises most of Bolivia’s western border.  Its land is 
arable and is suitable for grazing.  North-south communications are plentiful; however, 
these mountain ranges limit east-west trafficability to specific mountain passes. 
To the east of the Altiplano lie river valleys and semi-tropical climates known as 
Los Yungas and El Chapare.  Los Yungas lies generally east of La Paz and turns into El 
Chapare as the mountains begin to flatten out in the Cochabamba region.  Both areas are 
suitable for producing a variety of crops, including fruit, maize, coca, and coffee.  East of 
this region lie sea level plains that are suitable for agriculture.  They also possess 
expansive hydrocarbon deposits.  Because these areas are prone to flooding, they were 
some of the last areas settled by people pushing west from Argentina/Paraguay/Brazil and 





Beyond these plains lies the Chaco in southeastern Bolivia, and the Amazon in 
northeastern Bolivia.  The Chaco is a virtual wasteland of scrub brush.  It was not until 
the 19th century that modern expansion into the area with commercial agricultural 
practices made it suitable for crop cultivation and livestock.      
2. People 
The thirteen Aymara kingdoms spanned the area from just south of Cuzco along 
the Andean ridge and highlands.  It’s southernmost kingdom, Chichas, extended 
southwards beyond Potosi.  These kingdoms reigned from the twelfth through the 
sixteenth centuries. 
The Aymara governed their societies along both tribal and hierarchical lines, and 
they were organized around familial structures (ayllus).  There was no private land 
ownership, save that set aside for the nobility and local chieftains (caciques).  The 
nobility organized labor and ensured distribution of goods among the population.  Labor 
was organized around the mita system, which drafted workers for temporary periods and 
distributed the workload among the population. 
To sustain those regions less suitable for agriculture, the Aymara established 
colonies in the more fertile eastern regions.  It was essentially a “colony-core” system.12  
Crops grown in these areas were transported west to the population centers.  The eastern 
colonies brought the Aymara (and later the Inca) into contact with plain’s tribes of what 
would later become Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.  
Despite their subjugation by the Quechua (Inca) in the mid-fifteenth century, the 
Aymara were allowed to maintain their organizational structures so long as they 
continued to provide tribute to Cuzco.  The Incas controlled and governed the Aymara 
using local structures and leadership.  It was the same type of indirect rule used by the 
British in India, and it would prove to be a recurring theme in Bolivia’s history. 
The Incan conquest would make it as far south as modern-day northern Argentina, 
as well as into the Cochabamba Valley.  However, the Inca were unable to penetrate into 
the eastern portions of modern-day Bolivia.  The indigenous populations occupying these 
                                                 






areas would remain cutoff from western Bolivia until the Wars of Independence began in 
the early 1800s. 
While the indigenous peoples were not completely interconnected, when the 
Spanish arrived they found that significant links and organizations did exist in western 
Bolivia.  The peoples were still organized and governed along a mix of tribal and 
hierarchical lines by the Inca.  Their workforce was organized, and it could be converted 
into armies when necessary.  However, although connected, at this time subordinate 
ethnic populations could not collectively revolt against their Inca masters.  In fact, aside 
from local rebellions, the first major Indian uprising against the Spanish would not occur 





Figure 1.   Map of Bolivia13 
                                                 
13 United Nations Cartographic Section.  Reprinted with permission of the United Nations Publication 






























II. SEEDS OF A MOVEMENT: 1770-1879 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As the Spanish contended with developing ways to administer and control its 
viceroyalties from across the Atlantic Ocean during the eighteenth century, tensions 
began to mount between the native-born Spanish (peninsulares) and those born in the 
New World (criollos).  As with their North American-born English counterparts, criollos 
began to resent their subordinate position to the crown.  This resentment began to 
manifest itself in efforts to undermine royal authority in the New World.  What roll the 
ethnic populations could play in this contest, other than providing labor for agriculture 
and mining, was given little concern by elites.  In the eyes of the elites, the Indians would 
remain under heel, whether it was that of the peninsulare or that of the criollos.   
What was not understood at the time was that Bolivia’s ethnic population had 
some capacity to be a force of their own in the colonial and 19th century.  Through a 
combination of existing structure and shrewd adaptability, they were able to use the rules 
of Spanish governance to achieve a position of relative strength.  This trend would endure 
until the rise of the private mining elite. 
This chapter examines the interests of Bolivia’s indigenous peoples and their 
relationship to various elite actors.  By identifying inherent ethnic governance structures, 
and elite reliance on ethnic populations to buttress their own pursuits, this chapter argues 
that indigenous resilience and power were a function four factors:  their own inherent 
strength and adaptability, weak power-seeking elites, exploitation of Spanish colonial 
law, and the unique geography of the region. 
The organizational structures of the ethnic populations were communal and tribal, 
and they were sufficient for subsistence.  People within these communities were 
organized into an upper (organizing and ruling class) and a lower (labor) class.  In return 
for their labor, the upper classes ensured that their communities were provided for.  Ties 





through marriage.14  While sufficient for subsistence, the resources available through 
these networks were not enough to enable ethnic populations to resist the Spanish 
unilaterally.   
Several factors actually weakened these networks that otherwise functioned 
efficiently for subsistence.  Disputes among displaced Indians over original lands, 
different modes of labor and production, and differing attitudes towards the Spanish 
viceroyalty all would serve to weaken indigenous linkages.15  The factor that would 
provide ethnic groups with the greatest leverage would be their ability to integrate 
themselves into elite interests.  
Section one of this chapter focuses on the interests and coalitions leading up to the 
Tupac Amaru rebellion in 1780 through Bolivia’s declaration of independence in 1825.  
What is most significant about the Tupac Amaru rebellion is that, in fact, the criollo 
population actually followed on the coat tails of the Indians.16  The power demonstrated 
by the ethnic population, particularly in rural areas, foreshadows the indigenous mass 
mobilization theme that is recurrent in Bolivia’s history. Section two examines the period 
following independence through the end of the War of the Pacific in 1879.  This is a 
significant period in Bolivia because it marks the first time when mining profits 
surpassed the amount of revenue generated by the individual Indian tax.  It was during 
this period that the state became less reliant on its indigenous population.  This, in turn, 
reduced the amount of economic leverage indigenous populations could apply towards 
retaining the authority to self-govern, and it forced them to attempt to exercise arguably 
weaker power through the Spanish legal system. 
 
 
                                                 
 14 Joseph W. Bastien, “Land Litigation in an Andean Ayllu from 1592 until 1972,” Ethnohistory, vol. 
26, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 105.  Available from JSOTR. Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0014-1801%281 
97921%2926%3A2%3C101%3ALLIAAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 15 Ward Stavig, “Ethnic Conflict, Moral Economy, and Population in Rural Cuzco on the Eve of the 
Thupa Amaro II Rebellion,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 68, no. 4 (November 1998): 
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B. SECTION ONE: 1770—1825  
The Tupac Amaru revolt was a watershed event in the indigenous history of the 
region.  The rebellion lasted from 1770 to 1772, and it was conducted in generally two 
phases.17  The first phase was conducted around the Viceroyalty of Cuzco, while the 
second was conducted further south in Upper Peru (Bolivia).  The aim of the first phase 
was to directly challenge Spanish rule.  However, it did not represent a populist, mass 
peasant uprising.  Rather, as Campbell demonstrates, it was a carefully crafted uprising 
that was organized around Indian leaders.18  These leaders inspired the masses with ideas 
of reversion to an indigenous paradise under the direction of Tomas Katari.19   
The second phase extended as far south as Oruro and included La Paz; but its 
goals were markedly different from the first phase.  At the heart of the revolt was the 
issue of corrupt or ineffective local governance by local Spanish officials and caciques.  
During this period, three factors provide evidence of indigenous strength.  First, the revolt 
was coupled with legal action.  The revolt was directed in a way to signal that indigenous 
grievances were not with the “viceroyalty,” but with local officials.  Second, the revolt 
was generally Indian led.  It was only subsequent to the siege of Cuzco that criollos 
became more directly involved in the revolt, seeking to shrug off royal control in favor of 
their own.  Third, the Indians were able to raise an indigenous army of up to 40,000 
people, and they were able to disrupt movement and commerce over such a wide area.20  
Although previous Indian revolts had occurred, they were generally localized events of a 
much smaller scale in terms of numbers of rebels. 
                                                 
 17 While 1780 marks the first major violence in the Tupac Amaru rebellion, Serulnikov traces its its 
specific events in 1777, and to the general conditions that existed among the Spanish, criollos, and Indians 
around 1770 in: Sergio Serulnikov, Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in 
Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 126. 
 18 Leon G. Campbell, “Social Structure of the Tupac Amaru Army in Cuzco, 1780-80,” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review, vol. 16, no. 4 (November 1981): 690-691.  Available from JSOTR.  
Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-68%28198111%2961%3A4%3C675%3ASSOTTA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-
Z.  Accessed 5 January 2005.  
 19Sergio Serulnikov, Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-
Century Southern Andes (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 127. 






Eventually, the Indians and the criollos proved no match for the Spanish.  Spanish 
efforts had been reinforced by loyalists (loyal criollos as well as some caciques).  In the 
rebellion’s aftermath, the criollos were brought under tighter control, and the cacique 
class was officially abolished.  However, as it will be explained in the outcomes portion 
of this section, the end of the caciques did not mean an end to indigenous governance.  
Rather, it demonstrates Spanish recognition of the Indians’ acknowledgement of their 
subordinate but official role in the kingdom.  The Spanish decision not to destroy 
communal governance was the result of a limited balance of power achieved by the 
Indians.     
1. Actors and Interests 
a. Indigenous Population 
For the purpose of assessing this period in history, this study breaks down 
indigenous groups into three general categories based on geography and “occupation.”  
These categories are the western (mining/urban labor), central (rural/agricultural) and 
eastern (rural/agricultural/nomadic) groups. 
Both central and eastern groups are similar in that the majority of work for 
both populations was agriculturally based.  Both populations provided for their own 
subsistence, and both possessed their own form of internal organization.  They were 
organized along familial lines into ayllus.  The ayllus were further broken down into 
upper and lower classes.  Despite placing both agricultural indigenous populations into 
two categories, a finer distinction can be drawn with the Rural/Agriculture group.     
Their cacique-led hierarchical/familial organization was underpinned by 
tensions between those Indians who remained on communal lands and those who 
migrated between haciendas, urban areas and communal lands.  The former, known as 
originarios were in a relatively more secure position than the latter (forasteros) because 
they controlled access to their communal lands.  So long as there was ample room, 
forasteros would be accommodated.  However, as communal lands and haciendas began 
to compete with one another for space, there was not always room on communal lands to 
accommodate the forasteros.  Some were turned away; those who were granted 





originarios.  This cleavage is further evidence of the internal stratification that runs 
counter to understanding Bolivia’s indigenous movements as homogenous entities. 
The indigenous population used for mining, also subjugated to colonial 
rule and existing under arguably harsher conditions, had interests that were somewhat 
different than their rural counterparts.  Miners were (low) wage earners.  They were not 
landowners, and they did not provide for their own subsistence.  As such, their interests 
were more aligned with the traditional, universal interests of urban workers: better pay 
and working conditions, the right to organize and exercise voice in the workplace.         
Western and central agrarian tribes shared four major interests.  First was 
the right to occupy, own and cultivate their traditional lands.  This often led to divisions 
among the Indians who had been displaced by the Spanish, and those resettled onto their 
lands.  Second was the right to continue to practice self-governance.  Third was a 
reduction in the amount of taxes levied on their communities.  Under mitigating 
circumstances, such as poor harvests as a result of drought, the viceroyalty might reduce 
or waive a season’s community tax.  In other cases, communities actually underreported 
the number of people living on their land in order to reduce their tribute burden.  Fourth 
was for better treatment at the hands local authorities (caciques and corregidores).           
Caciques occupied a precarious position during this era.  They continually 
had to balance the interests of the indigenous population against the requirements of the 
Spanish “governors.”  As with all positions of authority, caciques were also vulnerable to 
their own interests, which may have not been related to their constituency, such as 
expanding their own coffers.  In some cases, caciques adopted colonial ruling measures, 
selling land for their own profit and expanding patronage practices.  Caciques are also 
known to have levied unauthorized taxes (in addition to the Crown’s legal taxes).  
Different loyalties among the caciques would lead to cleavages among the indigenous 
population that were exacerbated in some cases by their own corruptness.      
Despite similar desires for autonomy and the use of traditional lands, there 





those that who lived on Bolivia’s eastern Chaco frontiers.21  The latter’s contact was 
mostly with Jesuit (and later Franciscan) missionaries who were initially charged with 
expanding the influence of the Crown, offering in return conversion and education.  The 
key to understanding the relationship between the Church, state and southeastern Indians 
lies in the geography of the Crown’s expansion.   
Bolivia’s Chaco region is situated on what were the fringes of the 
Viceroyalties of Upper Peru and Rio de la Plata.  The Church established missions in this 
area, but it was limited in its ability to take control of the Indians.22  The Crown did not 
possess enough military resources to garrison this frontier from either its Atlantic or 
Pacific hubs, resulting in a more complementary relationship between the Indians and the 
Church.  Semi-sedentary Indians, already adept at agriculture, more readily developed 
closer ties with the Church, unlike the nomadic Indians who continued their mobile 
existence.  In fact, some Indians had actually asked the Crown for missions to settle in 
their areas in order to gain access to the resources associated with them.23  Conversely, 
when the republican state began its expansion into the Chaco during the twentieth 
century, these Indians and the Church developed closer ties with one another in order to 
blunt the state’s penetration.  The Franciscans had fallen out of favor with the state 
because their use of Church lands was not viewed as efficient in a liberal, market 
economy.   
Another difference is that western and central Indians were more closely 
tied to Spanish-controlled urban population centers such as La Paz and Cochabamba, and 
they were ultimately subjugated to Spanish colonial rule (which included requirements to 
pay taxes on their communal lands).  Eastern Indians continued to be relatively insulated 
                                                 
 21Resources on Bolivia’s southeastern Indians available in English are somewhat limited.  This is due 
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most of the useful literature on Bolivia’s southeastern tribes was found in studies of Argentina and 
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from the Spanish Crown.  Sedentary Indians of the eastern frontiers gradually developed 
ties with Catholic missionaries.  The nomadic tribes continued their mobile existence, 
often raiding the villages established by the sedentary Indians and the Church.24  
b. Criollos 
The criollos shared a single common interest with their colonial 
governors, and that was the maintenance of a system that provided stable and cheap labor 
capable of generating revenue.  However, similar to their North American English 
counterparts, the criollos became increasingly weary of the peninsulares’ governance.  
To that end, they desired to shrug off their royal masters and slowly began to develop 
ideas about autonomy and independence during this period.  The competition that did 
exist among the criollos was similar to the hacendados; both had to compete with one 
another, as well as with communal lands that were required to pay tribute for labor. 
c. Spanish Administration 
Aside from maintaining the conditions necessary to generate revenue, the 
Spanish had no interest in granting more autonomy to the criollos.  However, the Spanish 
still were faced with the challenges which all expeditions, whether civil or military 
encounter, how to maximize their gains with minimal resources (these challenges were 
exacerbated by competing loyalties among Spanish viceroyalties when the Spanish 
Crown fell to French control in 1808).  Their solution with regard to the indigenous 
population was similar to that used by the British in India, indirect rule. 
A second mechanism for extending control was the forced colonization of 
central and eastern Bolivia.25  Somewhat similar to the United States’ westward 
expansion towards the Pacific during the middle and late Nineteenth Century, the Spanish 
began to establish frontier towns in the Cochabamba Valley (and other points south and 
east) as mechanisms for consolidating resources and controlling popular routes.  While 
the Agricultural/Rural Indians still retained control of the countryside, this era marks the 
first significant penetration of central Bolivia by the Spanish. 
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The mines during this time remained under direct Spanish control.  Labor 
requirements continued to be filled by the indigenous population by continuation of the 
mita system.  The mita had, in fact, begun under the Inca.  The most significant 
difference between the two was the provisions made for the mitayos.  Under the Inca, 
mitas were generally convened for specific periods or tasks, during which the Incan 
government provided for the subsistence of the workers.  Under the Spanish, mitayos 
were paid a negligible wage, and they were forced to provide for themselves.  Mita 
contracts were often extended, and the Indians were often forced to purchase their wares 
and foodstuffs directly from the Spanish, thereby further exacerbating tensions among 
them. 
2. Groupings 
Different attitudes towards the Spanish among the Indians led to divisions that 
often resulted in intra-ethnic violence.  This was not necessarily a function of Indians 
being dragooned into elite armies, rather, these divisions were based on deliberate 
decisions made by Indian leaders.  During this period, three general factions developed.  
The first group was composed solely of indigenous peoples which led the revolt directly 
against Cuzco.  As described above, they directly challenged Spanish governance and 
hoped to return to traditional Fourteenth Century ethnic governance structures. 
Second was the coalition of Indian and criollo in Upper Peru, specifically in 
Oruro.  This group intended to replace Spanish control with their own form of 
government.  What is most significant about this group is that the Indians initiated this 
revolt while the criollos adopted a wait and see attitude.  This marks one of the few times 
in Bolivia’s history when elites and semi-elites followed the lead of the indigenous 
population. 
The third coalition was that between the loyal cacique and the viceroyalty.  These 
actors preferred the status quo.26  The latter preferred this because it continued to support 
an efficient system of colonial extraction.  The former preferred this because of the 
stability they had found by allowing themselves to be subsumed into the Crown.  As will 
                                                 







be explained later, not all Indians were denied access to the Crown’s legal system, and 
the Crown often ruled in the Indian’s favor. 
An ancillary influence on the options available to all actors was geography.  
Geography limited the penetration of the state, and had a limiting effect on intraethnic 
communications.  The rural population retained control of the countryside and routinely 
led localized revolts.  Geography created divisions among Altiplano and valley 
indigenous communities for control of traditional Inca-distributed lands.  Although ethnic 
populations controlled these lands, they had passed among various groups based on 
redistribution by the Spanish.  The outlier Indians remained isolated from the Crown, 
save limited penetration by religious missionaries. 
3. Decision-making Structures 
Two decision-making structures are significant during this period.  The first was 
colonial law as established by the Spanish Crown.  The second was the use of indirect 
rule by the Spanish.  Royal governance and jurisdiction were significant in that the 
Indians actually devised methods to use these systems to their advantage.  While one 
might assume that their only usefulness was to control the Indian population, in fact, the 
opposite was just as true.  As demonstrated by Sergio Serulnikov, the Indians worked 
within the legal confines of the system to bring grievances against corrupted corregidores 
and caciques.  Their adherence to the legal system, and their deliberate, general 
promptness in submitting their tributes, signaled to the Spanish viceroyalty that they 
acknowledged Spanish authority.27  What they sought in return for their submissiveness 
was relief from tyrannical, corrupt local Spanish and indigenous officials.    
In addition to the limited direct voice the Indians had in Spanish governance, they 
were allowed to retain their internal organizational and governance structures.  This 
limited autonomy provided the Indians with some control over their lives and served as a 
mechanism to sustain their interests.  It also promoted some competition among 
populations to ensure they would be able to meet their tax obligations. 
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4. Outcomes  
As a result of the failed rebellion, the Spanish abolished the cacique class and 
took direct control of the free communities.  However, the failure of this revolt was more 
significant to the criollos, who lost their ability to govern.  Because the Spanish still 
faced the problems associated with expedition, the Indians were still allowed to retain and 
work their communal lands and they were allowed to govern themselves (just under 
greater Spanish observation and scrutiny).  In fact, many local indigenous leaders were 
elevated to carry out those functions which had previously been performed by the 
cacique class. 
During the two decades leading up to the creation of Republica Bolívar, and 
shortly thereafter Bolivia, another factor affected the power capacity of the indigenous 
population.  It was during this time that mining revenues rapidly declined because of the 
destruction of mines during the Wars of Independence.  The result was an increased 
reliance by the Crown (and subsequently Bolivia) on the Indian populations’ ability to 
generate revenue.  Although the communal land tax was abandoned in favor of an 
individual Indian tax, the Indian population also received greater protection by the 
Spanish from the criollos because the Indians became the prime generators of revenue.  
Agriculture and textiles replaced mining as the primary sources of revenue for the state, 
and communal lands became even more protected by the state from encroaching 
hacendados. 
This period marked an expansion of indigenous capacity; the Crown still relied on 
indigenous communities for resource extraction.  The real losers were the criollos, who 
had their power checked by the Crown.  However, this relationship would not last.  
Following independence, the Bolivian government and the mine owners in the state 
would move closer together at the expense of the indigenous population.  The next 
section describes this evolution.    
5. Networks 
In terms of relative strength, the indigenous populations during this period could 
not be characterized as networked.  Although segmented and polycephalous, they were 





coordinate).  At this time, indigenous populations still did not have access to the 
resources that would enable them to challenge the superior coercive strength of the 
Spanish.  In the north, this was more significant because of their challenge to actually 
overthrow Spanish authority.  In the south, this was less so because the ethnic population, 
which had in earlier times been subjugated to Inca rule, was not trying to overthrow 
Spanish rule.  Rather, they acknowledged Spanish authority and sought its help to redress 
local, but widespread, grievances.28  
The links among indigenous nodes were still bound by geography and somewhat 
controlled by the Spanish, and indigenous nodes possessed inferior resources for coercive 
resistance.  Those links between the indigenous population and the Spanish did not 
facilitate the transfer of coercive capacity from the latter to the former.  There was also 
no opportunity for the indigenous population to establish links with nodes beyond 
themselves or the Spanish.  As demonstrated by the Tupac Amaru rebellion, buttressed 
by criollos and by the understanding achieved by the Spanish and the Indians, indigenous 
coercive power was still very much a function of their linkages with elites. 
C. SECTION TWO: 1826—1879  
1. Actor and Interests 
a. Indigenous Population 
Following Bolivia’s independence, the interests of agricultural/rural and 
mining/urban Indians remained relatively unchanged.  However, tensions continued to 
exist among Indian communities based on the competition for communal land rights and 
labor sufficient to meet tribute and subsistence requirements.  Redistribution of Aymara 
lands under the Spanish compounded grievances among altiplano and valley Indians as 
the former attempted to regain their traditional lands.29    
b. The State 
The criollos and former penisulares had become the new state elite in 
Bolivia, and both were dedicated to the increasing state and personal wealth and strength.  
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These elites sought to stabilize Bolivia and sought foreign investment to expand Bolivia’s 
development. 
Despite the creation of an official state, Bolivia’s boundaries were by no 
means settled.  While Bolivia struggled to expand its influence and gain control of its 
interior, it also began the arduous task of conducting international relations with its 
regional neighbors.  Bolivia’s ability to trade remained one of its core necessities, and in 
order to trade, Bolivia required access to the sea.  Bolivia’s primary access to the sea was 
via ports at Cobija and Arica on its Pacific coasts, which were eventually lost as a result 
of the War of the Pacific.  Access to the Atlantic was attempted using the Paraguay and 
Pilcomayo Rivers between Paraguay and Argentina, respectively.  Use of these 
waterways was precarious.  Both are seasonal rivers and are marginally navigable at best.  
Furthermore, the paucity of navigation legislation once beyond Bolivia’s borders in 
Paraguay made river-borne commerce financially risky.30  During this period, Bolivia 
would continually fight losing battles against the erosion of its borders.  
c. Mine Owners 
The arrival of the state as an actor during this period coincided the rise of 
the private mine owner.  The mining population favored privatization, although it had 
little use for the new state government outside of creating the free-market conditions 
necessary to expand their industry.  The ability of the mining industry to generate 
revenue would make its control –a struggle between privatization and nationalization – a 
particularly volatile, recurring theme in Bolivia’s history. 
2. Groupings and Decision-Making Structures 
The state and mine owners, based on their common interests and complimentary 
relationship, formed a coalition during this period.  The ethnic population still remained 
somewhat fractured between urban and rural areas, altiplano and Cochabamba valley, 
and hacienda and communal lands. 
Increasingly, the state began to favor legislation that supported the mining 
industry and privatization.  The Indian communal lands were no longer the most 
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significant source of revenue for the state, nor were they even a close second.  Despite the 
favoritism shown toward the mining industry, the mine owners took little interest in the 
development of the state (outside of mining activities).  
3. Outcomes 
A combination of the silver boom of the 1860s and the War of the Pacific in 1879 
produced several significant outcomes.  Based on the disruptions to state and industry 
caused by the War of the Pacific, the mining elites were no longer satisfied to remain on 
the sideline of national politics.  As a result, they resolved to take an active role in state 
politics in order to attempt to prevent such future catastrophes.  To that end, they also 
began to pursue more efficient forms of economic activity, which included the 
privatization of land ownership.   
Privatization included the abolition of communal lands during this period, which 
resulted in the rapid expansion of the hacienda system and forced many Indians off of 
communal lands.  The intent was to make the Indian a citizen, whereby the state could 
exercise direct legal control over the population.  This new campesino class was expected 
to commoditize its labor capacity for both urban and rural industries.31  However, the 
coercive capacities of the mine owners and hacendados greatly outweighed any ability of 
the campesinos to unite for common interests.  Mining and agriculture unions would not 
be allowed to form until the early Twentieth Century.     
4. Networks 
This period marked a significant decline in terms of indigenous capacity.  Had it 
continued, the base for indigenous power may have been completely extirpated.  
Expansion of the hacienda system and the mita for the mining industry increased the 
displacement of indigenous population.  This led to fragmentation along not only rural-
urban lines, but also among rural population due to the displacement caused by mining 
booms and busts.  Thus, indigenous groups were even more divided than they had been 
prior to Bolivia’s independence.   
These groups still did not possess any significant links outside of Bolivia, and 
their cohesion derived from inherent social, cultural and governing structures based on                                                  
 31 Eric D. Langer, “Andean Rituals of Revolt: The Chayanta Rebellion of 1927,” Ethnohistory, vol. 
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communal land ownership were also challenged during this time (see Figure 2).  The 
reduction of the number of communal lands as a result of the expansion of the hacienda 
system produced fewer communal leaders, moving indigenous groups away from 
network-organized social structures.  During this period, it was those rural communities 
that existed on the fringes of state control that maintained the cultural and societal links 
to keep a concept of indigenous identity afloat. 
Attempts by indigenous groups to coalesce into local governance structures 
occurred at the expense of establishing a greater-Bolivia indigenous movement.  This is 
not to suggest that these groups were attempting to establish a statewide movement and 
failing.  Rather, this period was a time of establishing local organization and learning 
how to work within the new state power structure as Bolivia transitioned from colonial 
rule to independence.    
D. CONCLUSION 
The period from the 1700s through 1879 can be classified as a period of waxing 
and waning power for the indigenous populations.  Their power was limited by internally 
and externally generated cleavages, little or no access to resources other than for the 
purposes of subsistence and tribute, and mining’s usurpation of agriculture as the state’s 
primary revenue producer.  However, the state was never able to gain control of the 
population, either through inclusion or exclusion.  While the indigenous groups possessed 
no economic power compared to the Spanish or Bolivian elite, this did not prevent them 






















Figure 2.   Early Networks and Relationships 
 
During this period, indigenous groups achieved little international voice and had 
yet to establish links outside of Bolivia.  Missionaries and the Church are examples of 
early forms of linkages that began to connect ethnic populations to non-state actors and 
give them voice outside their borders.  This trickle would eventually become a torrent 
with the introduction of communication technologies and the emergence of international 
organizations specifically designed to give voice to indigenous concerns.  
Despite the ascendancy of the mining elite and the state, their power would 
remain checked by internal weakness and international factors.  Not only were they 
vulnerable to the availability of labor and world markets for silver, the fledgling state 
itself also struggled with its neighbors to define its borders, all while gradually losing its 
direct access to the sea.32  In the early 20th Century, these international factors and 
actors, combined with shifting interests and power structures, would mark the most 
                                                 
 32 J. Valerie Fifer, Bolivia, Land, Location, and Politics since 1825 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972), 19-31.  Fifer points out that Bolivia was in the worst of all possible positions.  The 
state’s limited capacity to control its indigenous population, its landlocked geography, and its reliance on 
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significant shift in strength among Bolivia’s actors, and it would mark the subtle “tipping 
point” for Bolivia’s indigenous population.33  
                                                 
33 This definition of tipping point differs from Gladwells’s [see Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping 
Point: How Little Things can Make a Big Difference (Lebanon, IN: Back Bay Books, 2002)] in that what 
was occurring in Bolivia was a slow change.  Unlike epidemics which are readily observable, what was 






III. CULTIVATION: 1900—1953 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Bolivia’s mining elites had broken the 
state’s hold over the industry.  These elites, along with the military, began to exert greater 
influence in government as Bolivia struggled to define itself as a country.  
Internationally, Bolivia was attempting to find its place in world diplomacy and economy 
while devising ways to attract foreign investment.34  Bolivia also undertook efforts to 
attract foreign colonists to explore and settle its north and southeastern frontiers.35  
Regionally it struggled over economic and political relationships with its neighbors.36  
All the while, Bolivia struggled domestically over not only who would run the state, but 
also how its people would be organized to promote development.  Central to Bolivia’s 
development was the question over what role its indigenous population would play.  Key 
events that shaped Bolivia’s indigenous populations during this period included the rise 
of Bolivia’s Left, the revolt that transferred the capital from Sucre to La Paz, and the 
Chaco War and its fallout.   
The most significant event for Bolivia’s indigenous population during this period 
was the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) party’s overthrow of the 
military regime, presided over by General Hugo Ballivian, in 1952.  This chapter argues 
that, during the period from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth 
century, Bolivia’s indigenous movements developed an organizational base that solidified                                                  
 34The Act of 1905 encouraged immigrants to move to Bolivia and help settle her eastern lands.  This 
effort ultimately was a failure.  For more information on settlement patterns in eastern Bolivia, see: J. 
Valerie Fifer, “The Search for a Series of Small Successes: Frontiers of Settlement in Eastern Bolivia,” 
Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 14, no. 2 (November 1982): 410.  Available from JSOTR.  
Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-216X%28198211%2914%3A2%3C407%3ATSFASO%3E2.0.C 
O%3B2-9.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 35Lewis A. Tambs, “Rubber, Rebels, and Rio Branco: The Contest for Acre,” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review, vol. 46, no. 3 (August 1966): 263. Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor. org/sici? 
sici=0018-2168%28196608%2946%3A3%3C254%3ARRARBT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0.  Accessed 5 January 
2005.  Tambs provides a detailed account of Bolivian, Brazilian and Peruvian interests and encroachments 
into Acre and the various attempts made to resolve the issue.     
 36J. Valerie Fifer, Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972), 120-129.  The Acre region was rich in rubber resources and, despite being located 
within Bolivia’s boundaries, had been settled by Brazilians.  Attempts to settle the boundary dispute failed, 
and Brazil’s settlers declared their independence.  When Bolivia threatened to intervene militarily, Brazil 
heeded the call of its Texas and took control of the area with its military.  In 1903, Bolivia ceded over 





their ability to sustain themselves by the mid 1950s.  It examines the rise of indigenous 
power in relationship to domestic actors, the penetration of the international socialist 
awakening spawned in the 1920s, and how indigenous (now peasant) organizations 
became more complex during this period as new domestic actors emerged.     
While the creation of this base could not ensure that the Indian’s were on even 
footing with other agents in Bolivia, it did ensure that indigenous movements could not 
be ignored.  Indigenous power continued, somewhat, to rely on alliances with disaffected 
elites.  However, after 1953, even if indigenous power plays failed, the movement still 
possessed significant strength to continue their efforts. 
The structures of indigenous organizations remained heavily tribal and 
hierarchical; the difference during this period is that the indigenous populations involved 
in mining and those involved in agriculture began to develop closer ties.  In fact, at the 
beginning of this period, miner organizations actually took rural peasant groups under 
their wing.  However, these ties were not necessarily enduring.  By the end of this 
revolution, these rural organizations had begun to stand on their own.  The development 
of Bolivia’s infrastructure, especially roads and railroads, improved their ability to move 
resources, information and ideas between urban and rural areas.  Indigenous groups 
began to consolidate themselves in local urban areas through unions and in rural areas 
through ethnic-based communal organizations.  These cells would become the basis for 
larger indigenous movements that developed in the closing decades of the twentieth 
century.  
B. ACTORS AND INTERESTS 
1. Mining Elite 
Having gained momentum in the late 1800s, the mining elite continued their 
efforts towards privatization.  They continued to seek out international buyers for silver 
and tin, and they favored policies that would ensure a steady supply of labor.  To ensure 
the latter, mine owners favored the expansion of the hacienda system.  Because 
haciendas required less labor than communal lands, in theory it would free up Indian 
labor that could be transferred to cities and mining towns.  Haciendas also used lands 
more efficiently than traditional communities, which was critical to Bolivia’s move 





To support the former, the mining industry sought foreign investors to develop 
Bolivia’s infrastructure and transportation networks.  Railroads were developed with the 
aid of foreign assistance, connecting central and southern Bolivia, and Arica on the 
Chilean coast.  However, the lack of transportation lines into the southeastern frontier 
limited the effectiveness of the state, and it contributed to Bolivia’s failure in the Chaco 
War.  An excerpt from Bruce Farcau’s book on the Chaco war provides a vivid 
description of the geographical challenges to the development of Bolivia’s transportation 
network:  
The real weakness of the Bolivian Army in the Chaco War was actually 
a function of geography.  A Bolivian soldier traveling from La Paz to 
the front first covered more than four hundred miles by train to the railhead 
at Villazon.  He then traveled by truck or foot two hundred miles to the 
supply center at Ville Montes.  At the outbreak of the war a soldier still 
had another 250 miles or more to cover to reach the front at Boqueron, 
usually by foot over dirt tracks.  This was the route followed by every man, 
gun, and bullet that Bolivia used during the war. 37 
   
Even as late as 1950, suitable transportation links had yet to be developed as far 
east as Santa Cruz de la Sierra. 
By the turn of the century, the decline of world silver trade had a direct effect on 
Bolivia’s power structure.  Demands for tin supplanted that for silver, but silver miners 
were unable to transition their operations as rapidly as the emerging class of upstart tin 
miners.  Unlike their predecessors, the new class of tin miners chose initially to stay out 
of politics, and instead allowed their affairs and their relationship with the state to be 
handled by emerging urban professionals (roscas).  In fact, many of these mine owners 
did not even reside in Bolivia, instead practicing a form of “absentee capitalism.”38 
By the mid 1950s, the mining elite would lose its firm grip over the nation.  
Rivalry among these elites, combined with competition with the military and the new 
Left, severely weakened the mining monopoly.  This class was further undermined by the 
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growing social and political consciousness, and more importantly, organizational efforts, 
of miners and urban labor.        
2. The State 
During this period, the state began to develop greater intellectual and institutional 
cleavages along liberal and conservative lines.  The conservatives remained tied to Potosi 
and a liberal, privatized economy that still based on “the extraction of its natural 
resources.”  The conservative’s case for privatizing Bolivia’s indigenous population was 
two-fold.  First, Bolivia needed to stabilize its labor force, which meant extending the 
control of the state into indigenous communities to ensure that Indians were not only 
available to market their labor, but also properly trained to meet the requirements of 
Bolivia’s industry.  To that extent, efforts were undertaken by the state to develop them 
into a class that maximized production without necessarily developing into a political 
force.39   
The second intent was to strengthen the state’s control over the indigenous 
population by assimilating them and abandoning their “backwards ways.” 40  Having 
changed the formal status of indigenous peoples from “Indio” to campesino (peasant), 
the state attempted to undermine the legitimacy of their claims for land based on historic 
or traditional grounds.  Instead, the new campesino citizens were forced to compete for 
their interests within a legal framework that favored wealthy, land-owning citizens.  Also, 
because the Indians were now official citizens, they lost their special status and could be 
dealt with to the full extent of state law.  This is similar to United States Government’s 
treatment of North American Indians during the 1800s.41  By conferring upon the Indians 
the status of United States citizen, it provided a legal justification for the state to abandon 
the previous conventions that granted special rights to members of other nations. 
                                                 
 39Brooke Larson provides a thorough account of the curricula debate in “Capturing Indian Bodies, 
Hearts and Minds: The Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1910-1952,” Merilee S. 
Grindle and Pilar Domingo, eds., Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 188.  
 40Juliana Strobele-Gregor, Bert Hoffman and Andrew Holmes, “From Indio to Mestizo…to Indio: 
New Indianist Movements in Bolivia,” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 21, no, 2, Social Movements and 
Political Change in Latin America: 1 (Spring 1994): 108.  Available from JSOTR. Http://links.jstor.org/si 
ci?sici=0094-582X%28199421%2921%3A2%3C106%3AFITMIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W.  Accessed 5 
January 2005. 
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3. Shades of the Left 
Liberals were essentially the non-mining elite, and they held a different  
view on how Bolivia should be developed.  Unlike the conservatives centered around the 
silver of Potosi, liberals were more closely tied to La Paz (and tin mining), which during 
the nineteenth century had become a great trading crossroads for agriculture, natural 
resources and ideas.  The liberals sought to displace the mining elite by nationalizing the 
mines, and by developing Bolivia’s government into a federal system.  However, they 
proved to be closer to conservatives than the liberals that had developed between the 
1920s and mid-1930s.  In fact, the liberal identity was more anti-mining establishment 
than they were pro-socialist.  As Irurozqui points out: 
Far from representing different economic interests, the Bolivian political 
parties were, like their opponents, the expression of elite control of the 
political system.  The party lines did not correspond with social or 
professional divisions, nor, in the strict sense, with ideological ones…. 
Beneath the variations and substantive differences between conservatives 
and liberals lay a similar culture, a set of practices and conceptions that 
shaped the collective imagination of the privileged group…ensuring the 
cohesion of the elite.42  
   
The new Left appeared more akin to traditional European socialist organizations.  
Their socialist inclinations were fed by the consequences of the Great Depression and the 
miserable performance of Bolivia’s generals in the Chaco War.  All were reinforced by 
the rise in socialist thought that caught fire in Europe during the early 1900s.  With 
respect to the Indians, the new Left favored a return to their original Indio status and the 
creation of unions to protect the common laborer (in this case, the miners).   
The economic failure experienced under liberal leadership following the 
movement of the capital to La Paz resulted in a Republican takeover in 1920.  This group 
was comprised mostly of those conservatives who had lost power in 1899.  However, 
somewhat ironically, the rise of socialist thought coincided with the Left’s return to 
power.  It was under a conservative regime that elites started to question traditional 
relationships with labor and the indigenous population.  Thus, the indigenous population 
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began to regain its voice in the arms of a regime that had suppressed it two decades 
earlier.   
4. The Army  
Seeing the need to professionalize its military and put an end to caudillism, 
Bolivia sought military expertise from Germany in 1911.43  In this case, 
professionalization meant the subordination of the army to the extent that it did not 
respond to elites’ efforts to overthrow one another.  However, as has often been the case 
in Latin America, it did retain the image as an institution that could restore order and 
governance when civilian political mechanisms proved incapable.  Also, the state did not 
hesitate to use the military to quell Indian rebellions.  The most notable rebellion was that 
in Chayanta in 1927.  Indians forced the latifundistas from their lands when they failed to 
address Indian grievances.  The army was dispatched to restore order, and they 
subsequently dispatched over one hundred Indians.   
The turning point for the Army was the Chaco War, and it produced an army that 
was split into two camps.  Conservatives favored the old order, which included minimal 
government interference and sufficient resources to support their adventures.  In direct 
opposition to the old ways were Bolivia’s “Young Turks.”  These were junior officers 
who suffered from the incompetence of Bolivia’s general staff during the war.  They felt 
betrayed by a corps of general officers that had not provided the resources necessary to 
defeat Paraguay, and that had looked on the sufferings of the army with indifference.  
(Senior, conservative officers stood aside when the Young Turks came to power, fearing 
reprisals for their poor war performance if they favored the old establishment.)  These 
junior officers who were disillusioned by the Chaco war also came to oppose the mining 
elites.  The common hardships endured by these officers and their largely indigenous 
troops led them to align with the Left, which included favoring a return of indigenous 
rights after the war.  In this case, the preference was for Indian group rights instead of the 
rights of the individual citizen.  
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In 1934, disenchantment with the state, the mining elite and a failed liberal 
economy culminated in the arrest of President Daniel Salamanca by the army.  Salamanca 
went to the Chaco front intending to take charge of the army.  After a brief interlude with 
liberal party leader Tejada Sorzano at the helm, control of the government was passed to 
the military in 1936.  The military ruled Bolivia for the next four years under Colonel 
David Toro and German Busch.  Based on their experiences, and influenced by a rise in 
socialist thought, each leader responded with a form of military-socialism. 
The military had conflicting effects on Bolivia’s indigenous population.  The 
significance of these effects were three-fold.  First, resentment developed among Indian 
troops as a result of their use to suppress Indians uprisings.  Second, and paradoxically, 
military service would eventually become a form of validation within Indian 
communities.  The status of males within Indian communities, and more importantly the 
opportunities available to them, are directly tied to obtaining a certificate of military 
service.44  Third, military training, while providing Indians with a sense of nationalism 
and citizenship, also provided military and organizational training that could be used to 
undermine the state.  All three factors would gain significance in the years to come as 
indigenous communities consolidated their control over Bolivia’s rural areas.   
5. Indians 
At the beginning of 1900s, the groupings and interests of the indigenous 
population were similar to those of the previous century.  Both endured extreme hardship 
and exploitation.  These conditions were now compounded by the loss of their semi-
protected indigenous status.  Miners continued to seek better pay and working conditions, 
and the campesinos sought a return to self-governance and communal land ownership.  
The expansion of land privatization and resulting campesino migration towards the cities 
or other rural areas generated social and financial friction among the indigenous 
population. 
While significant improvements were not made towards indigenous autonomy, 
Quechua and Aymara leader met in La Paz in 1945 to hold the first Indian Congress.  
This was possible due to a weak state and the need for the MNR to expand and strengthen 
                                                 
 44Lesley Gill, Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life, and the Armed Retreat of the 





its constituency.  Indian leaders made their traditional demands.  Although none of their 
demands were realized by the state, the fact that elites allowed the Congress to convene 
reinforces the nature of indigenous groups as sources of power.  
C. GROUPINGS 
1. The Left 
Natural allies came together during this period and included liberals, socialists, 
and like-minded university students.  Given the rise of socialist thought generated in the 
1920s and reinforced by the Great Depression in the 1930s, the first major opposition to 
conservative thought developed, towards which Bolivia’s indigenous labor force 
gravitated.   
Interests supported by the Left included a return to the legal recognition of 
peasant communities, and labor and women’s rights.  These ideas had already taken seed 
in Peru among Marxist intellectuals, and their influence had begun to migrate to 
Bolivia.45  The effects of Peruvian insurgencies on Bolivian opinion would become a 
recurring theme in Bolivia’s recent history.  This would be exemplified by Bolivia’s 
cautious approach to insurgency towards the end of the twentieth century based on Peru’s 
experience with the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru and Sendero Luminoso.     
As demonstrated by Wickham-Crowley in later times, the political parties that 
emerged in Bolivia during this time were, despite the economic status of their 
constituencies, all led by intellectuals.  The parties differed along radical and moderate 
lines.  The MNR were national socialists who represented the moderate position.  To their 
Left were the Trotskyites, who strove to end personal service obligation and organize 
peasants into workers unions.  On the radical Left stood the Partido de la Izquierda 
Revolucionario (PIR).  Its members sought to liberate the Indians and to nationalize 
Bolivia’s mines.  While the PIR was the strongest initially, it was the MNR that carried 
the day in the 1952 rebellion. 
For the Indian population, the rise of the Left was both a source of strength and 
weakness.  It was a mechanism of strength because, for the first time, a portion of 
                                                 






Bolivia’s elites had begun to champion indigenous causes as a part of their larger 
interests.  However, the emergence of multiple parties on the Left provided different 
options that appealed to different indigenous populations.  This had the effect of pulling 
some indigenous groups apart based on differing attitudes towards government.   
The first unified act of this core was the forced move of Bolivia’s capital from 
Sucre to La Paz in 1899.  In support of the Left, Indians coordinated strikes in three 
major cities: La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba, the latter of which had been emerging as 
Bolivia’s power center east of the Andes.  In the end, the Indians gained little from their 
support of the federalist movement.  Promises to restore Indian rights and communal 
lands were quickly lost on the Left, who actually reinforced conservative policies towards 
the Indians once they had consolidated power in the new capital.  It was not until the 
military and the new Left took control of the state at the end of the Chaco War that the 
indigenous population would be in a position to enforce the demands they made in return 
for their support. 
Despite this natural affinity, it took time for MNR planning to mature with respect 
to the Indian population.  In 1949, the MNR attempted to seize power through a series of 
urban uprisings, yet they were soundly defeated.  Planning for the uprising revealed the 
MNR’s uncertainty as to how the peasant population would react.46  Therefore, Indians 
were not called upon to support the coup attempt.  In 1952, the MNR would not make 
this same mistake.  While the 1952 rebellion was primarily an urban affair, the peasants 
rapidly took control of the countryside.  The MNR took control of the major cities, but 
their influence extended into rural areas at the pleasure of the Indians.47 
2. The Right 
On the Right, conservatives, the traditional military elite and mine owners 
remained closely aligned.  These groups developed close ties with the United States and 
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Western Europe, both of which were interested in Bolivia’s silver and tin.  In addition to 
economic interests, the United States developed political security interests in Bolivia.  
The first concern was over the development of fascism in the 1930s and ‘40s.  In the 
1950s, this concern shifted with the rise communism.   
By the 1950s, different groups had individually usurped the groups of the Right.  
Silver mine owners were replaced by tin barons.  Junior military officers who fought in 
the Chaco War replaced their seniors, but their views were quite different from those held 
by their seniors.  Within the government, political parties of the Right and the original 
liberals were replaced by a combination of the new Left and a socialist leaning military. 
D. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES 
Two structures shaped decision-making during this period for the Indian 
population.  The first was the formal, legal structure, which ultimately provided them 
little recourse.  Having been stripped of their special status as Indian nations, the legal 
system conferred its favor upon those with capital: large landholders, mine owners, the 
military and the state.  Having lost the voice they previously had with the Spanish 
colonial government, Indians resorted to violence and localized rebellion.  As mentioned 
above, the most prominent example of this was the Chantaya rebellion of 1927.  Miners 
rebelled after mine owners and the state failed to address their concerns.  The army 
quashed the rebellion, leaving over one hundred Indians dead.    
The second decision-making structure was less formal, and was based upon the 
reciprocal benefits agreed to during the formation of alliances.  In return for supporting 
the liberals’ aspirations to displace the Right, the Indian’s were promised the return of 
their special status, communal lands, self-governance, and greater access to state 
resources.  Despite this alliance, the Indians did not necessarily possess the strength to 
enforce the terms of these alliances.  As also described in the previous section, the 
liberals defected from its alliance with the Indians following the successful establishment 
of Bolivia’s capital in La Paz in 1899.  In this case, the Indians were placed in an even 
worse position than before because the one elite political ally that had given them voice 





and in control of the countryside, was in a better position to help ensure outcomes more 
favorable to their interests. 
E. OUTCOMES 
The aftermath of the 1952 revolution solidified the position of the indigenous 
population as a force that could no longer be easily suppressed.  The government itself 
undertook limited socialist reforms, but stopped short for fear of being labeled a 
communist regime; its leaders had observed Guatemala and headed its lessons.  In return 
for this approach, Bolivia was rewarded with a generous aid package from the United 
States.  However, this support was not necessarily realized in rural indigenous 
communities, and Indian communities turned inwards to focus on reestablishing 
Traditional Communal Organizations (TCO) for self-governance.  TCOs would 
eventually develop into political units or sindicatos, and they also developed militant 
cells. 
Some of the first actions undertaken by the new government had immediate legal 
implications for the indigenous population.  First, all citizens, including the Indians, were 
granted suffrage.  This was not immediately responsive to Indian interests because the 
state was preoccupied with the immediate task of reconstructing a central government. 
Second, the state enacted the Agrarian Reform Act in 1953, which returned 
communal lands to the indigenous population.48  This act was more a measure of good 
housekeeping because Indians had already begun to seize rural lands in 1952.  In fact, the 
MNR had intended to pursue agricultural capitalism, but was prevented by the strength of 
the peasant control of the countryside.49  However, this was not the case throughout 
Bolivia.  Land ownership followed different patterns throughout the country.  The 
destruction of the hacienda system and the return of communal lands had the most 
significant impact in Western Bolivia, because that was where the sharpest economic and 
cultural differences between Indian and hacendado existed. 
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In the Chapare of the Cochabamba valley, haciendas had already begun to decline 
due to the loss of Altiplano markets, ecological stress, and the division of lands for 
purposes of inheritance.  Completion of the railroad connecting Bolivia with Peru in the 
vicinity of Lake Titicaca reduced La Paz’s economic reliance on the Cochabamba 
Valley.50  Landowners increasingly parceled out their lands and sold off sections to 
peasants in order to service accumulated debts. 51   In eastern Bolivia, where state 
penetration was the weakest, haciendas were not abolished.  The decision not to change 
the structure in the east was a combination of productivity of the land and sparse 
settlement.    
In Bolivia’s urban areas and mining towns, Indians would continue to strengthen 
their labor unions in the pursuit of workers rights and benefits.  Based on their proximity 
to apparati of the state, these labor unions had provided guidance for the rest of the 
indigenous population.  This changed after 1952.  The loose ties between urban and rural 
groups weakened as the peasants began to develop into a force of their own.  Ethnic ties 
were overtaken by local, industry-specific economic and political interests.52 
Rural and urban ties were further weakened by the MNR’s creation of the Central 
Obrera Boliviana (COB) in 1953.  COB was created by MNR to take control of Bolivia’s 
labor unions.  This included the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia 
(FSTMB), which had been allowed to develop during the 1940s.  While this brought 
miners closer to the state in terms of voice, it also subordinated their autonomy.    
F. THE NETWORK AND CAPACITY 
Structural trends during this period are similar to those of earlier eras.  The ability 
of indigenous groups to consolidate their power base had once again resulted from ties 
with minority elites.  Despite the limited social reforms of the MNR, Indians were once 
                                                 
 50Erwin P. Grieshaber, “Survival of Indian Communities in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia,” Journal of 
Latin American Studies, vol. 12. no. 2 (November 1980): 237.  Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jsto 
r.org/sici?sici=0022-216X%28198011%2912%3A2%3 C223%3ASOICIN%3E2.0 .CO%3B2-Y.  Accessed 
5 January 2005.  
 51Robert H. Jackson, “The Decline of the Hacienda in Cochabamba, Bolivia: The Case of the Sacaba 
Valley, 1870-1929,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 69, no. 2 (May 1989): 259-281.  
Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2168%28198905%2969%3A2%3C 259% 
3ATDOTHI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W.  Accessed 5 January 2005.  






again in a position, albeit weak, to deal with the state in a legal capacity (in a way that 
was similar to their relationship to the Crown during the eighteenth century).  The 
difference between this period and previous eras was that conditions now favored the 
development of ethnic insurgency.  The state was weak and could not meet the needs of 
the indigenous population.  Peasants controlled rural area, they had begun developing 
their own forms of governance absent the state, and they were well armed.   
The expansion of indigenous networks was still a few decades off (see Figure 3).  
As mentioned in the previous section, the reemergence of rural ethnic organizations 
following the revolution created a gap between urban and rural indigenous groups.  
However, the resultant inward focus of these groups enabled them to strengthen the local 
institutions that would later form the basis for more powerful indigenous coalitions.53  
This fragmentation satisfied the first condition of Gerlach and Hine’s model because 
these pockets of strength were segmentary.54 
 
 
Figure 3.   Networks and Relationships Towards Revolution 
 
                                                 
 53Deborah J. Yashar, “Democracy, Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin 
America,” World Politics, vol. 52, no. 1 (1999): 81.  Available from Project MUSE.  Http://muse.jhu.ed 
u/journals/wp/v052/52.1yashar.html.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 





















Indigenous movements during this time were not yet polycephalous.  Although 
different unions began to emerge, it was still too soon for true leaders to develop who 
could coordinate their efforts in support of an overall movement.  It was not until the 
1970s, as unions expanded, fractured and matured, that multiple autonomous leaders who 
could carry a collective message would emerge. 
The groups were also not yet networked together, but improvements to 
communication infrastructure continued.  Road, airfield and rail construction continued to 
connect rural and urban areas.  These physical links would enhance the transmission of 
resources and information, which would culminate with Bolivia’s telecommunications 
explosion in the late 1990s. 
Linkage of indigenous groups to international organizations had not yet begun in 
this period.  However, efforts led by the United States to buttress the MNR government 
in order to prevent the rise of a communist regime helped bring Bolivia attention to the 
world community, Western Europe specifically.  The expansion of foreign-sponsored 
domestic aid and development programs would slowly bring indigenous interests to the 
attention of the world in the following decades.  Thus, the foundation had been laid and 
the mold had set for the domestic and international rise of Bolivia’s indigenous groups.  
G. CONCLUSION 
During this period the foundation had been laid for indigenous groups to emerge 
as significant political and social movements.   Indigenous groups would not be capable 
of directly challenging the state for several decades, but the development of this capacity, 
as with any organization, is a gradual process.  Individuals may share a preference, 
indigenous interests in this case, but it takes time to identify leadership, establish control 
and organize people into a body that can exert influence on the state through coherent, 
collective action.  This process can become drawn out as sub-factions fight for control 
over a group and attempt to reconcile different interests.  Two factors characterize this 
process during this period.    
First, structure limited the strategies that the state and indigenous groups could 
pursue.  Because capacity is finite, allocating resources to one program meant that fewer 





Resources were limited, which meant the state had to make choices about where to 
consolidate control.  During this period, treasure was spent in efforts to improve the 
infrastructure of Bolivia’s major population centers, increase the capacity of the mining 
industry, and start to push west into its frontiers.  The decision to go to war in the Chaco 
limited the state’s ability to consolidate domestic control.  The minimal interference of 
the state in rural indigenous affairs created political space for these groups to continue to 
strengthen the quality and increase the number of their internal links—to consolidate.      
Second, what efforts the state did undertake to incorporate indigenous peoples 
into Bolivia, and indigenous groups’ approaches to integration with the state, represent an 
interactive process that was iterative.  One actor was not in complete control, and it 
cannot be concluded that one group can be identified as an independent variable.  Instead, 
what this chapter has demonstrated is that the relationship between the state and 
indigenous groups was one of reciprocal influence.  Both actors did not necessarily share 
the same understanding of their environment.  Each had a unique perception of the other 
and the environment that conditioned their responses and courses of action. 
Indigenous groups during this period were still not unified as a movement.  Local 
interests and political structures helped condition the actions and approaches of these 
groups to government.  In the western mining towns and urban centers, indigenous 
groups drifted towards traditional political parties and unions for representation and 
pursuit of their interests.  In central Bolivia, and especially so in the rural areas, 
























IV. WHY NOW: HARVESTING THE PAST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following the 1952 revolution, the new Left remained in power until 1964.  
During this period, Bolivian politics became paralyzed by strong urban labor and mining 
unions.  Peasant militias, still armed and in control of the countryside since the 
revolution, degraded government efforts to extend authority throughout the state.  During 
the early 1960s, the armed forces began to regain prominence under President Victor Paz 
Estensorro.  However, in 1964, after being elected to a third term, his coalition collapsed.  
Paz quickly ceded power to his running mate, General René Barrientos.  Military juntas 
of various flavors would continue to rule Bolivia until 1982, and even included a future 
elected president, General Hugo Banzer.  
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of Bolivia’s indigenous groups to a level 
where the state could no longer easily control them through violence, cooption, bribery or 
mere neglect.  Today, indigenous groups increasingly place limits on the ability of the 
state to act.  The question that must be asked is, why now?  Was the ascendancy of 
indigenous groups in Bolivia inevitable?  If the answer is yes, then the question becomes, 
why not sooner?   
Some might argue that certain flashpoints during this period were responsible for 
the growing power of indigenous groups: numerous cocalero (coca farmer) uprisings in 
the Chapare, the Cochabamba water war in 2000, annual marches and demonstrations in 
La Paz and other major cities.  While these flashpoints were spectacular events, they 
alone cannot explain why indigenous groups have become a force.  Sufficient resources 
had to be available, a certain level of organization had to be achieved, and indigenous 
leaders had to understand the dynamics of their environment in order to realize and act 
upon real and potential political opportunities.  Instead, these flashpoints may be more 








some ingredient, usually contributed by fortune, that deprives the elite of its 
chief weapon for enforcing social behavior (e.g., an army mutiny) or that 
leads a group of revolutionaries to believe (original emphasis) that the time to 
strike is now. 55  
 
While in this case Johnson is speaking about revolution and insurrection, 
accelerators can also be related to social movements, which are not necessarily violent.  
The significance of accelerators is that they are related to currents of underlying 
conditions that have a momentum beyond the actual spark.  Sparks that occur in the 
absence of underlying conditions may develop into spectacular events such as riots or 
demonstrations, but they do not result in significant changes in power or social order. 
The rise of indigenous groups was not just a matter of elites relaxing control or 
forming alliances with lower classes.  As described in the previous two chapters, this too 
had happened on previous occasions.  Also, it was not just a matter of organization and 
leadership.  As has been demonstrated, indigenous groups have been organized and led 
by their own since well before the arrival of the Spanish.  So the question remains, why 
now? 
This chapter argues that the ascendancy of Bolivia’s indigenous groups during the 
last decades of the twentieth century was the result of the their transformation into 
networked social movements.  The transformation provided these groups with resources 
and tools to increase their ability to organize, coordinate, and communicate (domestically 
and internationally) in such a way that generated leverage which could be used against 
the state and its international supporters.  This will be demonstrated by examining the 
alliances formed by indigenous groups based on their interests, their relationships to other 
actors, the mobilization of organizational and material resources, the framing of issues to 
generate solidarity among the movement, and the political opportunities recognized by 
indigenous leaders.  The shaping of Bolivia’s indigenous social movements by formal 
and informal decision making structures will be examined, followed by the outcomes of 
these interactions.  The chapter concludes with a description of the networked nature of 
Bolivia’s current indigenous movements.  
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B. METHODOLOGY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Much of the history of Bolivia’s indigenous population has occurred outside of 
formal decisionmaking structures.  In order to account for this, three concepts from social 
mobilization theory will be used because they offer a window into informal, grass roots 
movements, which are somewhat similar to the development and evolution of Bolivia’s 
indigenous movement.  These concepts are “mobilization processes (structure and 
resource availability), framing resonance, and shifts in opportunity structures.” 56 
In the case of mobilization processes, much of the organizing occurred outside of 
the state and was based on communal or tribal links.  These often served local needs, and 
they were suitable for competing with the viceroyalty or state over contentious issues.  
The type and timing of resource availability is also critical.  While resources were mostly 
available to indigenous groups for subsistence (although not necessarily at generous 
levels), resources for communication, legal expertise/education and access to decision 
makers were not always present. 
Framing resonance is significant because not all calls for rebellion are heeded.  
Rather, some gain more traction than others.  Furthermore, different frames, or 
conceptualizations, may cause action at different times.  How an issue is couched is not 
necessarily transferable among different populations or time periods.  
Political opportunity is important because it provides openings for actions that can 
advance the movement.  In the case of the indigenous movements, political opportunity 
generally results from one of two actions.  First is the generation of a mass, coherent 
group that is able to force its demands on those who control authoritative institutions.  
The second results from cleavages among groups, usually elites, that provide an 
opportunity to for indigenous groups to ally with powerful minority elites in the pursuit 
of related causes. 
These three attributes help not only identify the organizing and informal decision 
making structures.  They also help identify the resistance, or leveraging, capacity of a 
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group.    The range of collective, contentious actions that characterize an indigenous 
groups repertoire of collective, exists along a continuum that measures levels of violence.  
From the least to most violent, these actions are: 
1. Peaceful, legal opposition in accordance with law. 
 
2. Peaceful disruptive activities (civil disobedience). 
 
3. Violent disruptive activities (riots, blockades, strikes, para civicas). 
 
4. Coup.  For this thesis, coups are assumed to involve fewer people and  
      be have a shorter duration than armed revolution. 
 
5. Armed Revolution/Insurgency.  This is a protracted activity compared 
    to the coup.  It is not limited to violent activity, and may incorporate 
      short periods of violence (e.g., battles and raids) that continue over time. 
Three points must be made about characterizing activities using this spectrum.  
First, these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  Groups may pursue their 
goals through a combination of legal and violent activities.  Second is the level of 
violence or civic disruption associated with the action.  Third, in addition to the level of 
violence commensurate with the each category, the scope of the activity is just as 
important.  Local, isolated actions have less weight than those occurring simultaneously 
in different cities.  These may, in fact, be only riots, and not actual movements.   
Movement implies a higher form of organization and includes (generally) planned 
actions which occur over time.  Simultaneous actions also indicate a higher form of 
organization.  Simultaneous actions inspired, led, and carried out solely by ethnic groups 
have an even higher significance (when compared to action combined with other actors) 
because they indicate a relatively higher degree of autonomy.  It is these actions that most 
closely mirror an organization that is internally networked.  Similar to third wave 
insurgency, actions take the form of decentralized, collective activities, and various 
protagonist groups are capable of existing and operating in the absence of a central 
coordinating authority.  It is these characteristics that separate random riots and mobs 







C. HISTORICAL CONTEXT   
After the 1952 revolution, the military rule and caudillism had been discredited 
for the time being and retreated from national politics.  However, Bolivia reverted to a 
junta under General Rene Barrientos in 1964. 
Most of the 1970s were ruled over by General Hugo Banzer, who came to power 
as the result of another coup d‘etat.  The coup was supported by big business in eastern 
Bolivia and formed a conservative base to pursue economic reform.  Santa Cruz 
businessmen were eager to shift Bolivia’s economic alliances away from Argentina and 
towards Brazil, where they saw greater development potential.  Land reform during this 
decade was promoted by Banzer in an effort to shore up support from the peasant classes 
in central and western Bolivia.  However, the fading economic boom at the end of the 
1970s loosened the bonds formed between the Bolivia’s business class and Banzer. 
Two factors that would help strengthen the development of Bolivia’s indigenous 
groups were slowly coming together.  At the end of the decade, over half of the 
population lived in urban centers, and 72% of the population was bilingual.57  The 
combination of these two factors supported the development of networks that would 
facilitate coordination, organization, the exchange of ideas and resources, and the 
development of networks.  Although the organization of the lower classes continued to 
develop, inter- and intra-class competition of lower and middle class parties, which 
included urban an rural mixes, had yet to mature during this period to the point of being 
able to act collectively.        
The 1980s witnessed the true beginnings of multi-ethnic democracy, which was a 
result of political opportunities, the limited reach of the state, and the discontent 
generated by neoliberal economic shock therapy undertaken in 1985.58  Bolivia’s drug 
trade was in full motion, which helped keep the state at bay, providing resources and 
                                                 
57 Herbert S. Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 235. 
58 Public Broadcasting Service, “Up for Debate: Shock Therapy: Bolivia, Poland Russia:  Same 
Policies—Different Results,” Commanding Heights interview with Jeffrey Sachs on 15 June 2000.  






political space for indigenous groups to organize.  Outside of the major cities, the state 
controlled very little.  
Already limited in its capacity, the state made some concessions to Bolivia’s 
indigenous population based on its fear that Peru-like insurgencies would develop within 
its own backyard.  It was during this period that the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac 
Katari (MRTK) was created by those who were dissatisfied with the workers’ union 
Central Obrera de Bolivia (COB).59  This group, unlike other indigenous organizations 
before it, developed solely for the purpose of indigenous rights.  This idea spread 
eastward and eventually led to ethnicity-based peasant unions and the formation of the 
umbrella organization Confederacion Sindical Unica de Colonos Bolivianos (CSUTCB), 
marking the formal shift of the indigenous center of gravity from the miners to the 
peasants.  The CSUTCB became the subordinate trade union of the Katarista 
movement.60 
During the 1990s, Bolivia’s indigenous groups continued to establish themselves 
within the government.  In 1993, Bolivia’s first indigenous vice president, Victor Hugo 
Cardenas, was elected.  A result of his alliance with the left emerged in the form of the 
1994 revisions to the 1967 constitution.  These revisions specifically recognized Bolivia’s 
indigenous peoples.  This shift in focus towards local politics would bolster the strength 
of indigenous groups in part by conferring legitimacy on mostly indigenous politics.  It 
also reduced popular visibility on the state’s shortcomings, which had heretofore 
provided opposition groups with numerous ready-made justifications to rally against the 
state.  In 1997, former dictator Hugo Banzer was elected and continued the liberalizing 
efforts.   
In the opening years of the twenty-first century, Bolivia nearly elected its first 
indigenous president.  Indigenous groups played a significant role in the ouster of 
President Sanchez de Lozada, obtained concessions for the creation of a constituent 
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assembly, and have been gradually forcing the nationalization of Bolivia’s natural 
resources.  At the time of this writing, President Carlos Mesa serves not just figuratively, 
but literally, at the pleasure of the people. 
The following sections describe the major actors and coalitions that have resulted 
in the emergence of Bolivia’s powerful indigenous groups.  These groups have generated 
unprecedented leverage against the state.   
D. ACTORS, INTERESTS AND FRAMES 
1. Government and Interests 
The various regimes and administrations that ruled Bolivia during the last of half 
of the twentieth century all sought to expand Bolivia’s infrastructure and economy.  What 
differed among them were the ideas about how development should proceed.  The 
relative success of Bolivia’s economic reforms and coca eradication programs in the 
1980s and 90s made it the model for Western economic reform and development in South 
America.  Having created a stable base, the ability for Bolivia to expand its economy 
would be directly related to its ability to expand the capacity of state services and 
improve the quality and quantity of indigenous representation in government.  
President Banzers’ successful strengthening of the state declined with his health 
in the 2001.  Banzer was succeeded by his vice president, Jorge Quiroga, who ruled by 
constitutional appointment until his defeat by Gonzalo “Goni” Sanchez de Lozada in 
2002.  As finance minister, Goni had presided over the economic shock therapy 
administered in 1985, and later served as Bolivia’s president from 1993-1997.  Early in 
his second administration, he attempted to continue development along the neoliberal 
model.  He began to establish measures to privatize Bolivia’s emerging natural gas 
industry, which sparked eleven months of intermittent riots and violence, and ultimately 
led to his resignation in 2003. 
2. United States 
United States foreign policy towards Bolivia had been underpinned by interests in 
a cheap and steady supply of natural resources, and also a concern for the prevention of 
the expansion of communist regimes in the region up through the 1980s.  Bolivia’s role 





economic aid and development programs to counterdrug programs.  These programs 
focused on a mix of eradication, interdiction, education, and alternative development.61  
This was reinforced with law enforcement training programs to improve police 
investigative procedures, and revisions to the criminal code aimed at reducing 
corruption.62 
As a result of Bolivia’s successes, the growing insurgency in Colombia, and the 
United States’ global campaign against Islamist insurgency, the U.S. reduced its financial 
support to Bolivia.  Illicit drugs remained a low priority, and the primary U.S. interest in 
Bolivia was to support stable, democratic governance.  For example, in 2002 U.S. 
Ambassador to Bolivia Manuel Rocha publicly expressed his opposition to the potential 
election of Evo Morales63, whom he considered to be a radical, to the presidency.64  
Morales ultimately lost the election by a slim margin to Sanchez de Lozada.   
3. Indigenous Groups 
The rise of indigenous power in the last half of the twentieth century is often 
described as the emerging heyday of Bolivia’s indigenous movement.  Although it was 
markedly stronger during this period, it is premature and artificial to understand Bolivia’s 
indigenous organizations as a unitary group.65 As James C. Scott concludes in his work 
on revolutions, the true nature of revolution or opposition parties can be more precisely 
understood if they are seen as groups—with some shared interests—that build alliances 
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upon one another to achieve specific goals.66   This understanding reinforces the idea that 
explaining outcomes using the political economy method is not just about resulting 
policy, but also about what happens to the relationships and alliances that were initially 
formed around specific interests.  Closer scrutiny reveals the existence of numerous 
groups with different interests, perceptions of identity, and approaches to dealing with the 
state.   
Mining and urban workers immediately formed unions under the broad banner of 
the COB following the 1952 revolution, but rural Indians continued to remain outside the 
state fold.  As described in the previous chapter, an armed rural peasantry, combined with 
the weakness of the state, enabled indigenous groups to continue practicing local 
governance and communal land use.  The urban—rural divide was exacerbated by 
Quechua and Aymara leaders who, because of their dissatisfaction with the established 
political parties and differences with the COB, broke away during the 1970s to form their 
own interest groups. 
In the face of the waning mining industry in the 1980s, the Government of Bolivia 
reduced the scale of the state-directed mining concern, Corporacion Minera de Bolivia, 
in favor of agriculture.  Over twenty thousand miners—three quarters of the mining 
workforce—were let go, and they migrated to both urban and rural areas.67  This 
immediately reduced the importance of mining unions and thrust the rural peasant groups 
to the forefront of indigenous opposition politics.  Within the cities, the CSUTCB 
replaced miners as the dominant group within the COB.   
Infighting among the remaining mining unions also contributed to the shift of 
power towards the peasant groups.  At the beginning of this period, miner-based 
opposition groups framed their contention in terms of class conflict.  This was a product 
of previous ties with the Left, and gained prominence because of the proximity of mining 
groups to centers of state power (Sucre and La Paz).  Bolivia’s rural indigenous 
population framed its struggle in terms of indigenous identity.  No longer were assaults 
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on the indigenous population by the state purely economic; rather, they became attacks 
on the very foundation of indigenous culture and heritage.  This image was used to 
reinforce arguments against neo-colonialism and economic liberalization. 
Bringing indigenous groups together got off to a slow start.  In 1992, ethnic 
groups from throughout Bolivia descended on La Paz to hold the first “National 
Assembly of Peoples.”  The purpose of the assembly was to reach a consensus on 
indigenous goals and agree upon a plan to pursue them.  However, the assembly failed. 
Suspicion and distrust of one another among the groups prevented them from finalizing 
any resolutions and presenting a unified front.68 
In the midst of this ethnic resurgence, greater emphasis was placed on the cultural 
importance of coca.  While it had always been used in traditional religious ceremonies, as 
well as for reducing the physical effects of hunger, high altitude and exhausting work 
such as mining, indigenous groups began to re-emphasize its sacred significance.  Where 
once coca eradication had jeopardized only the livelihoods of those who relied on its 
cultivation and trade, it now was now framed as an assault on a specific people and their 
historical identity.  These frame shifts allowed Bolivia’s indigenous groups to present an 
image with which international audiences could more easily sympathize.  In addition to 
coca, indigenous groups adopted other symbols to represent solidarity.  One was the 
wiphala, the rainbow-colored flag representing the Aymara kingdom.  The wiphala is 
displayed in shops and houses, and en masse at demonstrations.  Others included the 
appropriation of the bowler by the lower classes, which previously had been a symbol of 
upward class mobility.   
Despite the success of peasant unions, they failed to capture the support of all of 
Bolivia’s indigenous groups.  Just how groups would be represented continued to be a 
divisive issue; the CSUTCB tended to view differences in terms of indigena and blanco, 
and it assumed that all indigenas shared similar interests.  Could a majority peasant group 
adequately represent minority indigenous groups that saw differences among ethnicities?  
And, could it represent indigenous groups that were not associated with, or interested in, 
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traditional labor unions.69  How could ethnic peasant organizations that recognized the 
authority of the state represent those who refused to identify themselves as citizens?     
The Indians of Bolivia’s eastern lowlands continued to remain removed from the 
state, as well as other domestic indigenous movements.  The CSUTCB failed in its 
attempt to bring the eastern Indians into the union because70 the latter realized that they 
would always be a minority group within the CSUTCB.71   Eastern Indians were not 
interested in integration into the state, and instead preferred to operate outside the 
CSUTCB and to limit their goals to local autonomy and dignity issues.72  However, the 
lessons of strength derived from presenting an organized and unified front were not lost 
on the eastern peoples.  They created their own indigenous groups—Confederacion 
Indigena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), Central de Pueblos Indigenas del Beni 
(CPDB), and Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani (APG)—to represent their interests and 
remain separate from traditional political parties, or indigenous groups tightly aligned 
with these political parties.    
4. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and International Interest 
Groups 
Hundreds of domestic and international NGOs operate in Bolivia. 73  NGOs began 
to emerge in Bolivia in the 1960s, however, they did not begin to gain traction for nearly 
thirty years.  The right-leaning state and left-leaning NGOs (which comprised the 
majority) had generally opposed one another for influence in Bolivia.  Government 
corruption tied to left-wing NGOs paved the way for neoliberal NGOs (e.g., USAID) to 
                                                 
69 Dwight R. Hahn, “The Use and Abuse of Ethnicity: The Case of the Bolivian CSUTCB,” Latin 
American Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 2 Ethnicity and Class in Latin America (Spring, 1996), 101-102.  
Available from JSTOR.  Http://links.jstor.orr/sici?sici=0094-582X%28199621%2923%3 A2%3 
C91%3ATUAA OE%3E2 .0.CO%3B2-P.  Accessed 5 February 2005. 
70 Ibid., 98.  
71 Ibid., 115. 
72 Juliana-Strobele-Gregor, Bert Hoffman and Andrew Holmes, “From Indio to Mestizo…to Indio: 
New Indianist Movements in Bolivia,” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 21, no. 2 Social Movements and 
Political Change in Latin America: 1 (Spring, 1994), 117-118. Available from JSTOR.  Http:// links. 
jstor.orr/sici?sici=0094-82X%28199421%2921%3A2%3C106%3AFITMIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W.  
Accessed 5 February 2005. 
73 International Crisis Group, “Bolivia’s Divisions: Too Deep to Heal,” ICG Report No.7 (6 July 
2004), 10.  Http://www.icg.org//library/documents/latin_america/07bolivias_divisions.pdf.   Accessed 5 





expand in Bolivia as the people and the state reacted against the Left.74  The boost that 
created the nexus of indigenous movements and NGOs came in 1994 when the senate 
approved Law 1551, the Law of Popular Participation (LPP).  This law created a new 
relationship for accountability and oversight of local areas—mostly those where the state 
exercised less influence or had weakly penetrated—and it empowered new 
organizaciones territotial de base (Territorial Base Organizations) to deal directly with 
NGOs.  Essentially, the state ceded some of its own authority to organize and develop 
remote communities directly to NGOs.75 
NGOs are required to register with the state, and in some cases, the state charters 
and subsidizes NGOs to provide certain services and specific tasks.  However, others are 
Left to pursue their own programs, and their level of accountability of is directly related 
to their distance from Bolivia’s major cities.  This is not to suggest that NGOs are 
operating in contradiction to state interests, only that they are subjected to less scrutiny 
by the state.    
A notable success story of indigenous-NGO relations is demonstrated by the 
CIDOB in eastern Bolivia.  With the help of NGOs, the Izoceno-Guarani and Ayoreo 
tribes cooperated to develop their own governing organizations (these two peoples had 
contemplated developing individual political parties, which most likely would have led to 
greater competition, but not necessarily greater progress).76  The culmination of this 
cooperation occurred when their governing body was weaned off of NGOs.  Funds and 
projects that had been awarded to NGOs assisting this body were turned over to the 
indigenous governing council, and they directly coordinated new projects.   
Funding for some NGOs has been intermittent.  Bolivia specifically had been the 
target of European NGOs until the mid-1990s.  During the Balkan Wars, Eastern Europe 
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took center stage and diverted NGO resources, aid and foreign investment that had 
traditionally been earmarked for Bolivia.77  European NGOs and donors often target their 
support to the poorest nations in the world.  In this case, Bolivia routinely competed with 
African nations experiencing the direst of conditions, making NGO support sporadic.78  
Finally, even major supporters like the United States change their priorities and reallocate 
funds accordingly (e.g., support for Plan Colombia).  Like other donors, U.S. aid is also 
conditional; Bolivia’s eligibility for aid is tied to counternarcotic efforts.  Regardless, the 
continued presence of NGOs in Bolivia has provided indigenous groups with alternatives 
to state development programs that have increased the political maneuver space. 
E.  GROUPINGS 
Indigenous groups alliances during this period can be described in terms of both 
internal and external groupings.  Some continued to join existing political parties, but 
others began to develop their own political organizations to ensure that their interests 
were properly represented.  In turn, larger indigenous interest groups began to interact 
with one another, but they did not coalesce into a single, unified movement.   
In western and central Bolivia, instead of joining political parties, these groups 
also began to create their own.  They organized themselves around ethnicity, and then 
developed politically from this base.79  During the 1970s, indigenous groups began to 
split with the Leftist parties with which they had previously been associated.  The 
Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Movement of the Left) was 
created on 1970.  The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda (National 
Revolutionary Movement of the Left) split from the MNR in 1970.  Another round of 
divisions occurred over leadership disputes in the late 1990s.  The Movimiento al 
Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism, or MAS) was created from the Asamblea por 
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la Soberania de los Puebles (Assembly for the Peoples Sovereignty), and the Movimiento 
sin Miedo (Movement without Fear) was created from the Movimiento Bolivia Libre 
(Free Bolivia Movement).  Internationally, indigenous leaders like Evo Morales began to 
establish ties with international indigenous rights movements and sympathetic 
governments.  
The following section outlines the mechanisms by which groups attempted to 
cultivate movements by looking at frames, resource mobilization and repertoires of 
collective action. 
1. Frames 
In the past, the Spanish conquerors, and later the Bolivian government, attempted 
to use multiple frames to co-opt the indigenous population.  As described in chapters two 
and three, previous efforts to incorporate this population into a labor-producing class 
included using existing tribal frames during the days of colonial indirect rule, followed 
later by client-patron (nobility-peasant) and citizenship frames.  Following the 1952 
revolution, the government returned to using peasant identity to frame local governance 
and land ownership issues.  However, the peasant frame gained limited traction among 
the population, which was increasingly framing issues in terms of ethnicity.  In the 1990s, 
the government formally acknowledged the peoples’ ethnicity frame.  
As indigenous groups competed with one another for dominance, each used 
different frames to try and build solidarity.  During the period when the miners’ unions 
and the state were dependent upon one another, indigenous contention was framed 
foremost in terms of class struggle.  However, this frame did not resonate among the rural 
indigenous population, which opted not to ally with the miners because they had different 
preferences.  Indigenous frames were not totally absent among miner identity; however, 
the use of indigenous frames by more militant, radical miners like Filipe Quispe Huanca 
failed to resonate with rural peasant groups.80  The fact that the miners’ concept of justice 
differed from that of the rural population further contributed to the failure of mining 
unions to frame the struggle for the entire indigenous population.  Justice for the mining 
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unions was understood mostly in terms of labor laws, while the rural populations’ ideas 
of justice centered on land rights, respect for local governance, and government 
protection and subsidies for the agricultural sector. 
As international demand for Bolivia’s natural resources began to wane during this 
period, the state reduced and marginalized the unions, in favor of developing Bolivia’s 
agricultural sectors.  Evidence of this shift can be found in the new frames of Bolivia’s 
indigenous groups.  Indigenous contention with the state, now based mostly in the 
countryside, was now framed in terms of ethnicity, history and justice. 
Domestic indigenous frames were reinforced by other regional ethnicity-based 
social movements throughout the latter half of the 1900s.  Ethnicity-framed social 
movements produced violent insurgent groups, such as the Movimiento Revolucionario 
Tupac Amaru in Peru and the Tupamaros in Uruguay.  In Ecuador, indigenous groups 
played a significant role in the January 2000 coup d’etat.  In Brazil, indigenous groups, 
with some radical offshoots, developed into the Movimiento dos Trabalhadores Rurias 
Sem Terra, or Landless Workers’ Movement.  These ethnicity frames have been 
amplified by the proliferation of international human, indigenous, and labor rights 
organizations.  
2. Resource Mobilization 
The focus of effort for indigenous resource mobilization was directed mostly 
towards improving organizational efficiency, coordinating mechanisms, and alliance 
development among the various indigenous groups.  In terms of social movement 
development, existing structural conditions favored mobilization.  First, assembly was 
not prohibited by the state, so the population could come together in existing communal 
and public spaces.  Indigenous control of the countryside contributed to this.  Second, the 
population was already organized along traditional, communal and trade union lines, so 
no new structures had to be developed.  Rather, the existing structures had only to be 
modified and directed.  Coordination across geographic boundaries was facilitated by the 
proliferation of communication technologies, specifically cell phones and the internet, in 





Indigenous self-reliance also supported the development of social movements.  
Indigenous dependence on the state was limited, and was further reduced by indigenous 
ties to non-state actors like NGOs and, to some extent, the underworld via illicit narcotics 
trafficking.81  The transactions that describe the quality of these relationships vary.  Links 
with the former resemble a semi-sustained transnational advocacy relationship, whereas 
links with the latter resemble transnational, temporary political exchange.82   
3. Repertoires 
Membership alone is not enough to demonstrate the existence of a social 
movement.  A group may be composed of members whose families share a direct 
indigenous lineage, but without collective contentious action (in this case, based on 
ethnic identity), the group is not a social movement.  Leites and Wolf explain the 
difference between preferences and behavior as the supply and demand of opposition.83  
A group may identify itself with a certain cause, exhibiting preferences for change        
(demand).  However, the group does not become a social movement until it begins to 
organize for the purposes of sustained action, that it to say, to exhibit behavior (supply).  
The supply side takes inputs and converts them into outputs that are aimed at expanding 
the movement and producing change.  The conversion mechanism, or social movement 
infrastructure, organizes people and resources, and generates outputs such as peaceful or 
violent demonstrations, services, publicity, etc.  Within social movement theory, these 
outputs comprise a group’s repertoire. 
The primary forms of collective action among Bolivia’s indigenous groups have 
been peaceful, but disruptive, demonstrations and blockades.  These often begin with 
marches that originate in rural areas, cover dozens to hundreds of miles, and culminate 
with the protestors descending on the capital.  An example of this was the 1990 “March 
for Land and Dignity.”  Over thirty-five days, around 700 demonstrators walked from 
Trinidad to La Paz (over 400 miles through the rainforest and the Andes) to demand legal 
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rights to traditional lands.  This action gained the support of Quechua and Aymara 
groups, and resulted in a presidential decree that prevented logging on certain tribal lands 
in the Beni Department.84 
These marches and demonstrations typically produce two immediate results.  
First, because the marches occur over several days, they are sure to catch the attention of 
both local and international media.  Second, because there are only two major routes into 
La Paz, the marches begin to disrupt traffic and commerce long before the protesters 
actually reach the capital. 
The level of violence exhibited by demonstrators is generally proportional to that 
exercised by the state, and it is generally limited to rock throwing and some vandalism.  
The level of violence associated with an event is also a function of time; demonstrations 
do not begin with violence, but are generally the result of escalating tension towards a 
tipping point, e.g., when police forces resort to violence to disperse crowds.  However, 
because demonstrations are often scheduled for a specific period, and planned and 
coordinated among the various groups, protestors often disperse without significant 
violence. 
Deliberate violence was not completely absent from the repertoire.  Cocaleros in 
the Chapare conducted violent campaigns when the GOB systemized its forced 
eradication campaign in the late 1990s.  During this period, militant cocaleros took up 
crude arms to ambush machateros (eradication forces).  They also began to construct 
crude improvised explosive devices to mine the helicopter landing zones used by the 
Rojos Diablos, the Bolivian Air Force unit tasked with providing air mobility support to 
the Fuerzas Especiales para la Lucha Contra Narco-Trafico, the special counterdrug unit 
of the Bolivian National Police.85    
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F. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES 
1. State Institutions 
Prior to 1994, access of Bolivia’s indigenous population to the national 
government was mostly limited to the alliances it could form with major political parties 
like the MNR, and indigenous interests were, at best, limited to local politics where they 
were the majority.  By 2004, indigenous leaders comprised one-third of Bolivia’s 
congressional representatives and nearly two-thirds of Bolivia’s municipal mayorships.86  
In rural areas, groups have created self-rule organizacion democratica rotativa (rotating 
democratic organizations).87  Unlike Western governing systems’ prominence of 
professional politicians, participation in community assemblies is perceived as a local 
“civic” duty and leadership is shared among heads of household.88  
2. Political Opportunities 
Decision-making structures alone are not significant without political opportunity.  
While some creations of political maneuver space are obvious, whether or not a political 
opportunity exists is often only understood ex post facto.  What makes the exploitation of 
space even less certain is that three things must occur.  First, an opposition group must 
correctly interpret the situation.  Second, it must develop a realistic, feasible plan and 
marshal the resources to execute it.  Third, it must properly execute the plan.  Even at this 
point, success is not guaranteed because the interaction between opposition and majority 
is both iterative and mutually influencing.  Each shape one another’s perception of events 
and courses of action. 
Actions can be taken to create political opportunities.  However, whether or not 
proactive measures are successful rests in large part on multiple variables.  Social 
movement and revolutionary theory literature have demonstrated how movements build 
on one another, and also how they take advantage of existing structures and 
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relationships.89  It takes time to generate frames that provide enough resonance to spur 
action.  Furthermore, in the absence of the complete exclusion of political parties, 
opposition movements are less likely to rebel against the state.  Latin America’s world-
famous historical example of one who failed to understand these dynamics was Ernesto 
“Che” Guevara.  He assumed that he could jump-start revolution in Bolivia, which had its 
rebellion against colonialism ten years earlier.  The oppression frame he attempted to 
impose failed to resonate with his targeted population; he and his vanguard did not even 
speak the same language of the population he was attempting to “inspire.”     
Bolivia’s indigenous population took advantage of three types of political 
opportunities during this period.  First, indigenous groups created their own opportunities 
through mass mobilization aimed at paralyzing transportation within major cities, and 
along the trans-Bolivia highway.  Terrain control was significant because it was a 
scalable repertoire.  Groups could shut down a single city, or the entire country.  As 
mentioned above, indigenous groups also created political opportunity by reducing their 
dependency on the state. 
Second, indigenous groups took advantage of the devolution or shifts of power 
among elites.  Even more so than in the past, elites seeking control of the state could only 
take control with the tacit approval of Bolivia’s rural indigenous population.  This was a 
function of creating a powerful base that could not only oppose other elites, but lower 
class urban and mining groups, as well. 
Third, indigenous groups combined alliance building and bandwagonning to 
increase their mass and generate greater momentum.  Similar interests provided the basis 
for alliances, but often groups with dissimilar interests or visions came together; this is 
what Kevin Healy has termed “reciprocal protest-action.”90  Indigenous groups often had 
various visions of the state and what should be done about it.  Groups like the 
Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (Pachakuti Indigenous Movement) sought a violent 
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revolution.  Others, like the cocaleros of the MAS party sought changes within the 
government, while some fought for changes to a specific policy.  When larger opposition 
groups were planning to strike, which could essentially shut the country down for up to a 
week, other single-issue groups would join the demonstration with the hope of tacking 
their issues onto the major grievances.      
G. OUTCOMES 
Revision to Bolivia’s constitution in 1994 declared the republic to be 
“multiethnic” and “pluricultural.”91  In accordance with the Law of Popular Participation 
(or law of decentralization), the state formally recognized peasant authority through the 
legal creation of the territorial base organizations and the sindicatos campesino, and it 
extended the authority of municipalities.  These grassroots organizations were also given 
the authority to provide budget oversight for municipal government developmental 
programs.92    
The Agrarian Reform Law of 1994 amended the 1953 version of the law.  The 
purpose behind the 1953 law was to try to incorporate rural indigenous peoples into the 
state by granting communal lands to them as peasants.  The new law specifically 
acknowledged the ownership of communal lands by indigenous groups.93  Thus, land 
ownership based on class identification now became land ownership based on indigenous 
identity.      
Between 2002 and 2003, President Sanchez de Lozada undertook reforms to 
privatize Bolivia’s natural gas industry and export it through Chile.  This met with 
rampant protest from indigenous groups along a number of lines.  First, groups preferred 
to nationalize the industry; the tax structure aimed at encouraging foreign direct 
investment that had been established as part of the 1985 shock therapy had produced little 
actual income for Bolivia.  Returns from taxes on foreign companies were, at the most, 
eighteen percent, which is one of the lowest rates in the world. 
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Second, opposition groups detested the idea of exporting natural gas through 
Chile.  Bolivia’s loss of its coastal territory to Chile in 1880 as a result of the War of the 
Pacific served as a rallying cry for nationalism.  This is significant because it is one of the 
few times that indigenous groups actually identified themselves as Bolivians.  Third, the 
events served as catalyst for a host of other demands that were thrown into the mix.  
These included demands for social reformation, expansion of state services, and even a 
reversion to a pre-sixteenth century Aymara Kingdom (Kallasayu).94  
The eleven months of Goni’s second presidency were marred by riots, strikes, and 
resulted in eighty deaths.  At one point, the Groupo Especial de Seguridad, the Bolivian 
National Police’s anti-riot and anti-terrorist unit, mutinied.  Several countries offered to 
mediate the dispute, or to provide alternate access routes for Bolivia’s natural gas to the 
sea.95  Goni requested financial support from the United States in order to improve his 
ability to make concessions to protestors’ demands, but was answered only with moral 
support.  The tipping point came in October 2003.  Amidst increasing violence and 
unrest, Goni resigned.96 
Vice President Carlos Mesa was elevated to the presidency with the approval of 
congress and made three immediate concessions to diffuse the standoff.  First, he agreed 
to hold a referendum on the future of Bolivia’s natural gas industry to determine whether 
or not it should be nationalized, to create new legislation that captured greater revenues 
from foreign controlled corporations, and to decide whether or not to construct a natural 
gas liquification plant within Bolivia to increase its export value. 
Second, he agreed to take steps towards the creation of a constituent assembly in 
2006 to increase congressional representation of indigenous peoples.  Third, he agreed to 
postpone coca eradication in the Chapare while it was being surveyed to determine how 
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much of the land could be used for legal cultivation.  The original plan had been to 
conduct the survey and eradication simultaneously.   
H. NETWORKS 
During this period, Bolivia’s indigenous groups displayed all of the characteristics 
of Hine’s and Gerlach’s definition of a networked organization.  The indigenous social 
movements were segmented, polycephalous, and networked.97   
The movements were segmented, exhibiting diverse membership in terms of 
location, professional association, and class.  Despite differences in the exact meaning of 
indigenous rights, the indigenous frame resonated across most boundaries and provided 
enough common ground for working through the government for change, as well as for 
mobilizing collective action against the state.  
The polycehpalous nature of the movements was demonstrated by two factors.  
First was the creation of multiple indigenous social organizations, especially in the east.  
Despite the emergence of large indigenous organizations such as Confederacion Indigena 
del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB) and new political parties (MAS, MNRI, etc.), their 
membership base was not homogenous.  Rather, these large groups really served as 
umbrella organizations composed of numerous local indigenous/peasant groups, and no 
single group spoke for all peoples.  Second, membership in multiple societies or 
associations (trade, political, community, etc.) also contributed to distributed leadership. 
Bolivia’s indigenous movement was networked in several ways (see Figure 4).  
Domestically, the ethnic frame resonated across many identities, which helped it to 
permeate the entire spectrum of Bolivia’s classes.  Connectivity was expanded by the 
number of people who exhibited multiple identities or membership, e.g., ethnicity, 
profession, religious, regional, tribal, etc.  In some areas such as El Alto, mass, proximity 
and homogeneity mutually reinforced the ethnicity frame, which made it extremely 
difficult for La Paz to control, especially from two thousand feet below.  This 
connectivity was reinforced by links with non-governmental organizations, regional and 
international third-state actors, and international organizations. 
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Regionally, leaders within of Bolivia’s indigenous movements established 
substantial links that amplified the voice of the movements and provided them with 
greater legitimacy.  Evo Morales skillfully developed relationships with government and 
international community leaders in the Andean region where he has been officially 
received on several occasions.  Morales has also established relationships with Presidents 
Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, ensuring that his support is not limited to neoliberal 
Western democracies.   
Beyond Latin America, Morales has cultivated sympathy through membership in 
international indigenous movement organizations.  He has been received in multiple 
countries, including Switzerland, Japan and Libya. 
I. CONCLUSION 
By 2004, Bolivia’s indigenous groups had developed unprecedented political and 
social power.  They also possessed the ability to deliberately disrupt Bolivia’s economy 
by closing down transportation routes and by making Bolivia less attractive to foreign 
investors.  Although they did not occupy the highest government posts, the state could, in 
fact, do little without at least the tacit approval of the indigenous organizations.  Bolivia’s  
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indigenous groups achieved this through a combination of recognized and self-generated 
political opportunities, by developing frames that legitimated common and dissimilar 
interests, and by taking advantage of existing social structures and spaces to mobilize 
collective action.  These actions helped increase the quality and quantity of linkages 
among the various indigenous groups, as well as expanded their linkages with 
international organizations and third-state actors.  These networks were reinforced by the 
gradual infiltration of Bolivia’s peoples into state government. 
The relative autonomy of Bolivia’s indigenous groups signals a clear power shift 
away from the state.  Power in Bolivia is now split between the indigenous groups and 
the Santa Cruz economic hub.  This shift to the east has even inspired some businessmen 
to call for autonomy of Bolivia’s crescent. 
Despite the increase of indigenous power, this is not to suggest that Bolivia’s 
indigenous movements are unified.  Preference differences still exist based on local 
interests (urban or rural) and competing views of modernization, representation, local 
governance, land use and government protection of markets.  These differences fuel 
suspicion among the groups and prevent complete unification, except in the direst of 
circumstances.  These differences also provide political opportunities for other groups, 
such as Bolivia’s eastern business sector and the military, to take advantage of in the 






A.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has described the mechanisms that have led to the recent rise of 
indigenous power in Bolivia.  As has been demonstrated, this phenomenon was not 
simply the result of indigenous groups allying with elite opposition.  Nor was it just a 
case of indigenous mass finally overpowering an elite minority.  The story of the 
ascendancy of Bolivia’s indigenous groups was, in fact, the product of both structure 
(opportunities and constraints determined by the environment) and strategy (the 
reciprocal interaction of the various actors). 
This chapter reviews the theoretical framework used to explain the rise of 
indigenous power.  It is followed by a review of the major themes of each chapter and the 
major findings of this study.  It concludes with recommendations for further study of 
competition for power in Bolivia. 
B.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework used to explain the ascendancy of Bolivia’s indigenous 
groups began with political economy methodology and was reinforced by an emphasis on 
the organization and connectivity of the various actors.  This framework was helpful to 
demonstrate sources of strength and the expansion of indigenous networks.  However, 
this framework was unable to get at the heart of how indigenous groups mobilized and 
developed into a significant force.  A purely structural argument is not sufficient because 
it can reasonably be argued that the conditions were always ripe for indigenous groups to 
come to power.  If this was in fact the case, a structural argument is unable to explain 
why indigenous groups did not come to power sooner.  At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, a pure agency argument would submit that the right leaders with the right ideas 
had not come along until recently, e.g., Evo Morales or Filipe Quispe Huanco.  However, 
charismatic indigenous leaders and ideas of autonomy have certainly existed throughout 
Bolivia’s history. 
To fill this gap, this thesis turned to social movement theory (SMT).  By 
examining the images used by groups to frame issues, cultivate the faithful and appeal to 





identification and creation of political opportunities by indigenous groups; and the 
examination of repertoires, a greater level of fidelity on just what forces were at work 
was able to be achieved.  For example, SMT helped to explain why ethnicity frames 
obtained with some tribes, but not others.  It also helped to distinguish between the stated 
aims of groups and their true interests.     
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY         
As described in the second chapter, the period from the 1700s through 1879 can 
be classified as a period of waxing and waning power for the indigenous populations.  
However, the state was never able to gain control of the population, either through 
inclusion or exclusion.  While the indigenous groups possessed no economic power 
compared to the Spanish or Bolivian elite, this did not prevent the indigenous population 
from adapting and functioning under their rulers.  During this period, indigenous groups 
achieved little international voice and had yet to establish significant links outside of 
Bolivia.  Missionaries and the Church were early linkages that began to connect ethnic 
populations to non-state actors and gave them voice outside their borders. 
Intra-ethnic linkages during this period were strong, and communities remained 
organized along traditional, hierarchical lines.  Indigenous power was diffused through 
the different alliances made by community leaders.  The caciques did not share the same 
affinities; some allied with the Spanish government or the Church, some with criollos, 
and some with other tribes.  In southeastern Bolivia, the nomadic tribes preferred to be 
left to themselves.         
Chapter III demonstrated that the foundation had been laid for indigenous groups 
to emerge as significant political and social movements.   First, structure limited the 
strategies that both the state and indigenous groups pursued.  The state generally retained 
control of the urban areas while indigenous groups retained control of the countryside.  
Each could pose a challenge on the others’ terrain, but their capacity to do so for a 
sustained period was limited.  These limited incursions created political space for 
indigenous groups to organize.  However, indigenous groups were still not unified.  
Mining/urban movements and rural indigenous groups developed along separate 





Indigenous networks during this period began to coalesce around two hubs: 
urban/miner and rural.  Both developed ties with the political Left, but the formers’ 
linkages were arguably stronger based on proximity to elite power centers and because 
the state mining industry was dependent on its mining labor force.  Because rural 
indigenous groups were more removed from the state, they were able to strengthen 
internal community linkages.  These relationships formed the base for their ascendancy in 
the twentieth century.  
Chapter IV incorporated social movement theory to increase the resolution of how 
indigenous groups actually moved from interests groups into a social movement that 
exhibited contentious behavior.  Competition among the various groups to frame their 
issues and assume leadership included class, ethnic similarity, ethnic divergence, and 
religion/tradition.  Furthermore, these groups organized along a variety of lines that did 
not always lend themselves to coalition building, e.g., Western political party, trade and 
labor unions, ethnic groups, Traditional Community Organizations, etc.  Ultimately, the 
indigenous frame had multiple meanings among the groups and was not solely a unifying 
frame.  Instead, it was reinforced with an injustice frame that could easily be tied into 
almost every grievance. 
During this period, networks among Bolivia’s three major indigenous movements 
strengthened, as did linkages to external actors.  Linkages to other countries and 
international interest organizations provided indigenous movements with voice and 
resources on an unprecedented level.  Relationships with Venezuela and Cuba, and 
emerging relationships with Brazil have increased the diversity of support systems 
available to indigenous groups, which allows them to absorb shocks from other 
international actors such as the United States.  
D.  FINDINGS 
This research has led to five findings based on the evidence presented.  First, 
ethnicity alone is a generally weak frame given the various interests and forms of 
organization among the tribes and classes within Bolivia.  A more accurate way to 
describe ethnicity-based opposition in Bolivia is not as an indigenous movement, but as 





Second, the gradual inclusion of indigenous groups by the state, reinforced by the 
introduction of NGOs and the expansion of indigenous ties to regional and international 
groups, most likely prevented the radicalization of the movement.  However, this also 
made the indigenous population less reliant on the state and reduced indigenous norms 
for toleration of perceived state injustices. 
Third, with respect to organization and networks, prior to the arrival of the 
Spanish, significant hierarchical and community networks existed among the various 
indigenous tribes and classes.  The limited ability of indigenous groups to connect with 
one another was a factor of both Spanish (and later state) influence and geography.  
However, even despite this influence, intra-community networks were strengthened in 
areas where the state had little penetration.  This strengthening laid the groundwork for 
indigenous groups to begin to connect as development and technology helped the 
population surmount the challenges of geography and remoteness. 
The significance of geography in this process cannot be overstated.  While it 
initially proved to be a barrier to indigenous connectivity, it transformed into one of the 
major features of contentious action.  The ability of indigenous groups to isolate specific 
cities within Bolivia, or the entire country, was an indispensable, scalable tool that these 
groups could use to counter the physical coercive capacity of the state.  The GOB may 
have the legitimate monopoly on the use of force within its borders, but it fails to be a 
credible deterrent if it cannot be applied at any time throughout the state.   
Fourth, while indigenous groups did ally with elite opposition groups, this was not 
solely causal.  Indigenous groups were often in a position to make significant demands on 
elites and used structure to their advantage (e.g., indigenous challenges to hacendandos 
using Spanish law, the use of urban control to make demands upon elites, ignoring elites 
when new resource opportunities become available, etc.). 
Finally, it is not possible for indigenous groups to recreate a pre-colonial state.  
However, indigenous groups are rebuilding Bolivia from the inside moving outwards, 







E.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Figure 5.   Assessment Considerations 
 
1. Strategic Level Policymakers 
While Bolivia may continue to be described as a weak state, the same cannot be 
said for its societies.  Orders may be published in La Paz, but they will continue to be 
issued from east of the Andes Mountains.  Future competition for control in Bolivia will 
continue between the eastern business sector and the indigenous groups.  Bolivia’s 
structural conditions (struggling economy, limited infrastructure, etc.) will limit the 
courses of action available to the groups competing for power.   
The need to improve the economy while expanding social welfare ensures that 
economic nationalization, coca, natural gas extraction and free-trade agreements will 
continue to be contentious issues.  However, the ability of the United States to influence 
these issues may become increasingly limited as Bolivia’s interest groups develop ties 
that diminish the significance of U.S. aid.  U.S. foreign policy will require a more 
sophisticated approach.  How well the U.S. understands Bolivia’s actors and their 
networks will be critical to crafting precise, discriminate foreign policy.     
What is certain is that eastern business’s freedom of action will be increasingly 
subject to the interests of indigenous groups.  Santa Cruz is just as vulnerable as La Paz 
In order to evaluate interest groups and networks, both 
strategic political assessm ents and tactical pre-dep loym ent 
site surveysshould consider: 
•M ob ilization Spaces and R esources  
•Fram es
•Political O pportunities
As has been dem onstrated, a large portion of social 
mobilization in B olivia  occurs outside of official political 
structures.  U nderstanding networks in B olivia  and where 






and Cochabamba to blockades, and the region’s natural gas and oil fields also remain 
vulnerable to interference and disruption by domestic groups. 
Finally, structural arguments may identify the conditions that favor the 
development of social movements, but a greater level of fidelity is necessary if one is to 
predict their potential and trajectories.  Organization and social movement theories 
provide a solid framework for this level of analysis.   
2.  Tactical Level 
This thesis has demonstrated that Bolivia is not a strong nation-state in the 
traditional sense.  Rather, it is a constellation of ecosystems and subsystems, and each 
system is different.  Working in and among a local population requires the development 
of local knowledge, and an understanding that this knowledge varies among each 
community.  For those operating at the tactical level, four points are significant. 
First, for the indigenous population, military service is a double-edged sword.  
The bonds formed between the lower classes within the military and the Left during the 
Chaco War do not exist.  One year of conscripted service is still levied on Bolivia’s 
young men, the majority of which come from Bolivia’s indigenous population.  Although 
allegiance to the state (and its military) is mixed at best, military service in and of itself is 
seen as an honorable endeavor.  Within many indigenous communities, a certificate of 
military service is the gateway to future employment, and it increases ones social 
standing within the community. 
Second, United States and European-based NGOs permeate Bolivia, and they 
have achieved mixed results.  Some have improved communities’ abilities to organize 
and develop infrastructure well beyond what the state could have provided.  Others have 
had less impressive results.  When operating among indigenous populations, it is 
paramount to not only know which NGOs are operating within an area, but also to 
understand their historical relationship with the population.  Some NGOs have 
established significant credibility in some communities, and their cooperation or tacit 
approval per se may help reduce the friction between a population and the military.  






Third, many government agencies operate on long-term plans.  While success or 
major improvement to quality of life is always predicted somewhere in the future, little 
actually happens in the present.  Tactical level operators should take note of this and 
endeavor to find out what type of projects they can undertake that will have immediate 
effects.   Immediate results are tangible    
Finally, as communication technology proliferates and transportation 
infrastructure improves, indigenous groups have increasing access to information and 
resources.  These links include relationships with other legal and illicit nodes.  
Understanding specifically how a population ties into or associates with others, and from 
where it obtains its resources, is critical in developing efficient strategies for 
counterinsurgency, stability and humanitarian operations.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Several explanations have been given for the ascendancy of Bolivia’s indigenous 
groups.  Structural arguments identify the conditions under which movements have 
developed, but they fail to explain why some groups are successful and others are not.  
Agency arguments fail to explain why Bolivia’s previous indigenous leaders were unable 
to achieve the same level of success, or why earlier frames of ethnicity did not obtain.  
  This thesis has demonstrated that the rise of indigenous power in Bolivia can be 
understood best by examining the organizational structure of these movements, and by 
applying social movement theory to help explain why some groups have been successful 













































LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
 
Albo, Xavier.  “Making the Leap from Local Mobilization to National Politics.” NACLA  
Report on the Americas (March-April 1996).  Http://www.harftord-hwp.com 
/archives/41/201.html.  Accessed 5 February 2005.  
 
Albo, Xavier and William Carter.  Raices de America: El mundo Aymara.  Madrid:  
Alianza America/UNESCO, 1998. 
 
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. The Advent of Netwar.  Santa Monica, CA: RAND,  
1996. 
 
Bastien, Joseph W.  “Land Litigation in an Andean Ayllu from 1592 until 1972.”  
Ethnohistory, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 101-131. Available from JSOTR. 
Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0014-1801%28197921%2926%3A2%3C101 
%3ALLIAAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8.  Accessed 5 January 2005.  
 
Beltran, Javier.  Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas: Principles,  
Guidelines and Case Studies.  Norwich, UK: Page Brothers 2000. 
 
Campbell, Leon G.  “Social Structure of the Tupac Amaru Army in Cuzco, 1780-81.”   
The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 61, no. 4 (November 1981): 675- 
693. Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-68%28198111 
%2961%3A4%3C675%3ASSOTTA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z.  Accessed 5 January 
2005. 
 
Canaghan, Catherine M. and James M. Malloy.  Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and  
Neoliberalism in the Central Andes.  Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,  
1994. 
 
Corbett, Charles D.  “Military Institutional Development and Sociopolitical Change: The  
Bolivian Case.”  Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 14,  
no. 4, Special Issue: Military and Reform Governments in Latin America 
(November 1972): 399-435. Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor.org 
/sici?sici=0022-1937%28197211%2914%3A4%3C399%3AMIDASC%3E 2.0. 
CO%3B2-B.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 
Eckstein, Susan.  “Transformation of a ‘Revolution from Below’—Bolivia and  
International Capital.”  Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 25, no.  
1 (January 1983): 105-135.  Available from JSOTR.  Http://l inks.jstor .org/sic 
i?sici=0010-4175%28198301%2925%3A1%3C105%3ATOA%22FB% 
3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 
Farcau, Bruce W.  The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, 1932-1935.  Westport, CT  






Fifer, J. Valerie. Bolivia, Land, Location, and Politics since 1825.  Cambridge, UK:  
Cambridge University Press, 1972. 
 
________.  “The Search for a Series of Small Successes: Frontiers of Settlement in  
Eastern Bolivia.” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 14, no. 2 (November  
1982): 407-432. Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-
216X%28198211%2914%3A2%3C407%3ATSFASO%3E2.0.C O%3B2-9.  
Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 
Freres, Christian. “The European Union as a Global “Civilian Power: Development  
Cooperation in the EU-Latin America Relations.” Latin American Policy and  
Society, vol. 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 63-86.  Available from JSTOR.  Http://lin 
ks.jstor.or g /sici?sici=0022-1937%28200022%2942%3A2%3Cv%3A 
TEUAAG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 
Forero, Juan.  “Where Incas Ruled, Indians are Hoping for Power.”  New York  
Times.   17 July 2004. 
 
Ganson, Barbara.  “The Evuevi of Paraguay: Adaptive Strategies and Responses to  
Colonialism, 1528-1811.”  The Americas, vol. 45, no. 4 (April 1989): 461-488. 
Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1615%28198904% 
2945%3A4%3 C461%3ATE OPAS%3E2 .0.CO% 3B2-R.  Accessed 5 January 
2005. 
 
Gerlach, Luther P. and Virginia H. Hine.  The Structure of Social Movements:  
Environmental Activism and its Opponents.  John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt,  
eds., Networks and Netwars.  Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.  
 
Gill, Lesley.  Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life, and the Armed  
Retreat of the Bolivian State.  New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. 
 
Gustafson, Bret.  “Paradoxes of Liberal Indigenism: Indigenous Movements, State  
Processes, and Intercultural Reform in Bolivia.” D. Maybury Lewis, ed., The  
Politics of Ethnicity: Peoples in Latin American States.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002. 
 
Gladwell, Malcolm.  The Tipping Point: How Little Things can Make a Big Difference.   
Lebanon, IN: Back Bay Books, 2002. 
 
Grieshaber, Erwin P.  “Survival of Indian Communities in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia.”  
Journal of Latin American Studies.  vol. 12, No. 2 (November 1980): 223-269. 
Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-216X%28 198011 








Hahn, Dwight R. “The Use and Abuse of Ethnicity: The Case of the Bolivian CSUTCB.”  
Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring 1996): 91-106.  Available 
from JSTOR.  Http://links.jstor.orr/sici?sici=0094-582X%28199621%292 3%3 
A2%3 C91%3ATUAA OE%3E2 .0.CO%3B2-P.  Accessed 5 February 2005.                          
 
Healy, Kevin.  “Political Ascent of Bolivia’s Peasant Coca Leaf Producers,” Journal of  
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 33, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 87-121.   
Available from JSTOR.  Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1937%2819  
9121%2933%3A1%3C87%3APAOBPC%3E2.0%3B2-Y.  Accessed 5  
February 2005. 
 
Hoffman, Bruce.  Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, OP-127-IPC/CMEPP.   
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004. 
 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines.  Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Toward a  
Mine-Free World (USA: Human Rights Watch, 2004).  Http://www.icbl.org /lm/2 
004/print/lm 2004execsum.pdf.  Accessed 24 February 2004. 
 
International Crisis Group. “Bolivia’s Divisions: Too Deep to Heal,” ICG Report No.7 (6  
July2004).  Http://www.icg.org//library/documents/latin_america/07_bolivias_d 
ivisions.pdf.  Accessed 5 January 2005.     
 
Irurozqui, Marta.  “Political Leadership and Popular Contest: Party Strategies in Bolivia,  
1880-1899.” The Americas, vol. 53, no. 3 (January 1997): 395-423.  Available 
from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor.org/sic i?sici=0003-1615%28199701%2 953%3 
A3%3C395%3APLAPCP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 
Johnson, Chalmers.  Revolutionary Change, Second Edition.  Stanford, CA: Stanford  
University Press, 1982. 
 
Jackson, Robert H.  “The Decline of the Hacienda in Cochabamba, Bolivia: The Case of  
the Sacaba Valley, 1870-1929.” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol.  
69, no. 2 (May 1989): 259-281.  Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jsto r.or g/si 
ci?sici=0018-2168%2819 8905%2969%3A2%3C 259% 3ATDOTHI%3 E2.0.C 
O%3B2-W.  Accessed 5 January 2005.  
 
Klein, Herbert S.  A Concise History of Bolivia.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University  
Press, 2003. 
 
Kohl, James V.  “Peasant and Revolution in Bolivia, April 9, 1952—August 2, 1953,”  
The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 58, no. 2 (May 1978): 238-259. 
Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor.or g/sici?sici=0018-2168%281 9780 










Langer, Eric D.  “Andean Rituals of Revolt: The Chayanta Rebellion of 1927.”  
Ethnohistory, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Summer 1990): 227-283. Available from JSTOR.  
Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0014-1801%28199022%2937%3A3%3C2 27%3A 
ARORTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y.  Accessed 5 January 2005.  
 
________.  Robert H. Jackson.  “Colonial and Republican Missions Compared: The  
Cases of Alta California and Southeastern Bolivia.” Comparative Studies in  
Society and History, vol. 30, no 2 (April 1988): 286-311.  Http://links.jst or.org/si 
ci? sici=0010-4175%2819 8804%2 930%3A2%3C286% 3ACARMCT 
%3E2.0.CO%3B 2-A.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 
Larson, Brooke. Cochabamba, 1550—1990: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation  
in Bolivia.  Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. 
 
________.  “Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearts and Minds: The Gendered Politics of  
Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1910-1952.” Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar  
Domingo, eds. Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective.   
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 
Los Tiempos.  28 June 2002.  (Translated by FBIS) 
 
Mainwaring, Scott.  “Party Systems in the Third Wave.” Journal of Democracy, vol.  
9, no. 3 (July 1998): 67-81.  Available from Project MUSE.  Http://muse. jhu. 
edu/jour nals/journal_of_democr acy/v009/9.3mainwaring.html.  Accessed 5 
January 2005. 
 
Mallon, Florencia E.  “Indian Communities, Political Cultures, and the State in Latin  
America, 1780-1990.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 24 (1995), 35-53.    
Available from JSTOR.  Http://links.jstor.orr/sici?sici=0022-216X%28199 92 % 
2924%3C35%3AICPCAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-PY.  Accessed 5 February 2005. 
 
McKee, Christine.  “The Campaign for an Instrumento Politico: The Latest  
Developments in the Indigenous Movement in Bolivia.” Paper presented to the  
Society for Latin American Studies—Postgraduates in Latin Americas Studies 
1999 Conference; The Graduate Institute; University of Hull; Hull, England (4-5 
December 1999), 4.  Http://www.uea.ac.uk/dev/pilas/McKee1.pdf.  Accessed 5 
February 2005. 
 
Nye, Jr., Joseph S. “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 153-171. 
 
Patch, Richard.  “Bolivia: The Restrained Revolution.” The Annals of the American  
Academy of Political Science, no. 334 (March 1961): 123-132. Available from 
JSOTR. Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28196103%29334%3C 123% 








Quispe, Filipe speech entitled “Oppressed, but not Defeated.” Erick D. Langer and Elena  
Munoz, eds.  Contemporary Indigenous Movements in Latin America.   
Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. 
 
Republica de Bolivia.  Constitucion Politica de Bolivia 1967 con Texto Reformada de  
1995. 
 
Roper, J. Montgomery.  “Bolivian Legal Reforms and Local Indigenous Organizations:  
Opportunities and Obstacles in a Lowland Municipality,” Latin American  
Perspectives, vol. 28, no. 1 (January 2003): 139-161. Http://lap.sagepub .com/ 
cgi/reprint/30/1/139.  Accessed 5 January 2005.  
 
Serulnikov, Sergio.  Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in  
Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes.  Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003. 
 
Saeger, James Schofield.  “Another View of the Mission as a Frontier Institution: The  
Guaycuruan Reductions of Santa Fe, 1743-1810.”  The Hispanic American  
Historical Review, vol. 65, no. 3 (August 1985): 493-517. Available from JSOTR.   
Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2168%28198508%2965%3A3% 3C493 %3A 
AVOTMA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 
Sanabria, Harry. “Resistance and the Arts of Domination: Miners and the Bolivian State.”  
Latin American Perspectives, vol. 27, no.1 (January 2000): 56-81. Available from 
JSTOR. Http://links.j stor. org/sici?sici=0094-582X%2820 0001%2927%3A1% 
3C56%3ARATAOD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 
Scott, James C.  “Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars.” Michael  
Taylor, ed.  Rationality and Revolution.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988. 
 
Singlemann, Peter. “The Closing Triangle: Critical Notes on a Model for Peasant  
Mobilization in Latin America.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol.  
17, no. 4: Peasant Political Mobilization (October 1975): 389-409. Available from 
JSTOR.  Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-4175%28197510%291 7%3A4%3C 
389%3ATCTCNO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
Stavig, Ward.  “Ethnic Conflict, Moral Economy, and Population in Rural Cuzco on the  
Eve of the Thupa Amaro II Rebellion.” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review, vol. 68, no. 4 (November 1998): 737-770. Available from JSOTR.  
Http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2168%28198811%2968% 3A4%3C737 
%3AECMEAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P.  Accessed 5 January 2005. 
 
Strobele-Gregor, Juliana, Bert Hoffman and Andrew Holmes.  “From Indio to  
Mestizo…to Indio: New Indianist Movements in Bolivia.” Latin American  
Perspectives, vol. 21, no. 2, Social Movements and Political Change in Latin 
America: 1 (Spring 1994): 106-123. Available from JSOTR. Http://links.jstor.or 
g/si ci?sici=0094-582X%28199421%2 921%3A2%3C10 6%3AFI TMIN%3E2 





Strobele-Gregor, Juliana. “Culture and Political Practice of the Aymara and Quechua in  
Bolivia: Autonomous Forms of Modernity in the Andes.”  Latin American  
Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 72-90. Available from JSTOR.  
Http://links.jstor.orr/ sici?sici =0094-582X %281996 21% 2923%3 A2%3 
C71%3ACAPPOT%3E2 .0.CO%3B2-2.  Accessed 5 February 2005. 
 
Tambs, Lewis A.  “Rubber, Rebels, and Rio Branco: The Contest for Acre.” The  
Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (August 1966): 254-273. 
Available from JSOTR.  Http://links.jstor. org/sici? sici=0018-2168%28196608 
%2946%3A3%3C254%3ARRARBT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0.  Accessed 5 January 
2005.      
 
Tarrow, Sydney.  Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and  
Politics, 2nd Edition.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
United Nations Cartographic Section.  Bolivia, no. 3875, Rev. 3, August 2004. 
 
United States Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration), Drug  
Intelligence Brief, Changing Dynamics of Cocaine Production in the Andean  
Region (June 2002).  Http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs /intel /02033/02033.html. 
Accessed on 23 October 2004.   
 
Wooster, Robert.  The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903.  New Haven,  
CT: Yale University Press, 1988. 
 
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America: A  
Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956.  Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Witkorowicz, Quintan.  Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach.   
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
 
Yashar, Deborah J.  “Democracy, Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge  
in Latin America.” World Politics, vol. 52, no. 1 (1999): 76-104. Available from 
Project MUSE.  Http://muse.jhu.ed u/journals/wp/v052/52.1yashar.html.  













INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer) 
Camp Pendleton, California 
 
7. Dag Hammarskjöld Library of the United Nations  
 United Nations  
 Room L- 327  
 New York, NY  
  
